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Abstract 
This report explores the economic implications of an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), a 
comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and a combination of the two in the EU. We 
illustrate the key trade-offs in designing ACE and CBIT in the presence of tax distortions at 
various decision margins of firms, such as its financial structure, investment, profit allocation 
and discrete location. Using an applied general equilibrium model for Europe, we quantitatively 
assess the effects of ACE, CBIT and combined reforms in EU countries. The results suggest 
that ACE is welfare improving as long as corporate tax rates are not used to cover the cost of 
base narrowing. CBIT typically reduces welfare by exacerbating marginal investment 
distortions. When governments adjust statutory corporate tax rates to balance their budget, 
however, CBIT reforms become more attractive while ACE reforms are welfare reducing in a 
number of countries. European coordination of reforms mitigates fiscal spillovers within the EU 
and renders ACE reforms more, and CBIT reforms less, attractive for welfare. A combination 
of ACE and CBIT reforms can be designed to be revenue neutral and welfare improving 
through smaller financial distortions. 
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Executive summary 
The comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) and the allowance for corporate equity (ACE) 
have recently gained interest in European policy debates as a way of restructuring corporate tax 
systems. Indeed, a number of countries have experimented or actually implemented reforms in 
the direction of an ACE. Others have put limitations to the deductibility of interest, which goes 
in the direction of CBIT. This report explores the economic implications of ACE and CBIT 
reforms in two different ways. First, we theoretically analyse ACE and CBIT in an open-
economy framework capturing various behavioural responses. It sheds light on the key trade-
offs in designing such reforms. Second, we adopt an applied general equilibrium model for 
Europe to quantitatively assess the effects of ACE and CBIT in EU countries. The model 
encompasses several decision margins of firms, such as marginal investment decisions, their 
financial structure and the choice of multinational companies with respect to foreign direct 
investment and international profit shifting.  
The results suggest that ACE reforms in an individual country generally improve efficiency 
by removing the distortion between debt and equity finance and by reducing the cost of capital. 
As long as governments finance the ACE with higher taxes on labour or consumption or by 
lower transfers to households, welfare in Europe expands by between 0.4% and 0.8% of GDP. 
The ACE is particularly attractive in countries featuring high corporate tax rates and a broad tax 
base such as Germany, Italy and Spain. If ACE is accompanied by higher corporate tax rates to 
make up for the lost revenue, however, this erodes the corporate tax base through profit shifting 
and by adversely affecting the discrete location choice of multinationals. It illustrates the key 
trade-off for the ACE between a low tax on the normal return on capital and a low corporate tax 
rate on economic profit. If base erosion is strong, ACE tends to reduce welfare. This occurs in 
most Western European countries. Eastern European countries still benefit from ACE since they 
host a relatively small multinational sector. A joint European ACE is more likely to improve 
welfare since European cooperation eliminates fiscal spillovers within the EU, thus mitigating 
the erosion of the corporate tax base in response to higher corporate tax rates. 
CBIT in an individual country yields a similar effect as ACE on the financial structure of 
companies. However, by disallowing a deduction for interest, it increases the cost of capital, 
thereby exacerbating investment distortions. When the extra revenues raised by CBIT are used 
for higher transfers or for reducing taxes on labour or consumption, welfare in the EU falls by 
between 0.3% and 1.2% of GDP. This holds most notably in countries with high corporate tax 
rates. If CBIT is combined with lower corporate tax rates, however, the corporate tax base 
expands through several channels, especially via inward profit shifting and by improving the 
location advantage for profitable investments. If these channels are strong, CBIT is found to 
raise welfare in a typical European country by around 0.8% of GDP. Countries featuring high 
corporate tax rates, such as Germany and France, and countries that are relatively sensitive to 
 6 
profit shifting due to a large multinational sector, such as the Netherlands and the UK, gain 
most from a unilateral introduction of CBIT and lower corporate tax rates. Under a European 
CBIT, lower corporate tax rates exert smaller welfare gains since fiscal spillovers within Europe 
are mitigated. Still, CBIT tends to raise welfare as long as profit shifting vis a vis outside tax 
havens is sufficiently strong. 
A revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT reforms is able to improve efficiency by 
alleviating distortions in the debt-equity choice of companies. A higher cost of capital on debt-
financed investment is now offset by a lower cost of capital on equity-financed investment. 
Aggregate investment slightly increases. Welfare is found to expand by 0.3% of GDP on 
account of a more efficient financial structure.  
The results suggest that a policy of corporate tax base broadening and rate reduction is likely 
to continue if European countries will not cooperate. CBIT-like reforms fit into this direction. 
This is consistent with recent trends in corporate tax policy in the EU. If Europe succeeds in 
cooperation, it might be able to relax fiscal spillovers and thus allow countries to design more 
efficient corporate tax systems with higher statutory rates. An ACE might then become a more 
serious alternative. 
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1 Introduction 
Corporate income tax systems in Europe follow general accounting principles by allowing a 
deduction of interest payments when determining taxable profits. Dividends paid to 
shareholders are not deductible. In economic terms, this creates a distortion in financial 
structures as both interest and the normal return on equity are a usual remuneration for the funds 
of financing a company’s capital. The exemption of only interest from the corporate tax base 
therefore leads to excessive debt finance and discriminates against risky or volatile businesses 
that generally require low financial leverage.  
To make corporation tax systems more neutral vis-à-vis the financing structure of 
companies, alternatives have been proposed. Among them are the comprehensive business 
income tax and the allowance for corporate equity. The comprehensive business income tax 
makes the corporation tax neutral towards the financing structure by disallowing the exemption 
of interest paid for corporate income tax purposes. The allowance for corporate equity system 
obtains the same result by granting equity holders an allowance equal to a notional risk-free 
return on equity (e.g. the market interest rate for long-term government bonds). Neither the 
comprehensive business income tax nor the allowance for corporate equity distorts the liability 
side of corporations. The difference is that the comprehensive business income tax has a wider 
tax base while the allowance for corporate equity features a narrower tax base than current 
corporate income tax systems. Hence, other things equal, the comprehensive business income 
tax allows for a lower statutory corporate income tax rate (or lower rates of other taxes) to 
generate the same amount of revenue while the allowance for corporate equity requires a higher 
statutory tax rate (or higher tax rates elsewhere).  
Recently, the allowance for corporate equity and the comprehensive business income tax 
have received renewed interest from policy makers. For instance, Italy, Croatia and Austria 
experimented with allowance for corporate equity features in their corporate tax systems. Brazil 
and since 2006 Belgium have an allowance for corporate equity. At the same time, many 
European countries have introduced thin-capitalisation rules that limit interest cost 
deductibility. The Netherlands has introduced an interest box where both interest received and 
interest paid face a reduced rate of 5%. Such reforms go in the direction of a comprehensive 
business income tax. 
This study assesses the merits of the allowance for corporate equity and comprehensive 
business income tax regimes, as well as a combination of the two systems in European 
countries. In principle, these systems should be analyzed in combination with personal taxation 
on income from capital. For instance, if interest and dividends are treated differently at the 
personal level, an allowance for corporate equity would not be fully neutral in a closed 
economy since domestic households – the ultimate owners of the firms – face different taxes on 
debt and equity. Personal taxes become less important in an open economy, however, as the 
 8 
marginal provider of funds may not be subject to income tax. In this study, therefore, we ignore 
interactions with the personal taxation of capital income and focus entirely on the 
discrimination of taxes at the level of the firm. 
The study starts in section 2 with an up-to-date theoretical overview of the properties of the 
allowance for corporate equity and the comprehensive business income tax systems. We 
provide a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of introducing them, either separately or as a 
combination. Section 3 discusses the CORTAX model and its calibration. The model is used to 
quantitatively assess the economic implications of allowance for corporate equity, the 
comprehensive business income tax and combinations between the two. Sections 4, 5 and 6 
present our quantitative assessment of, respectively, the allowance for corporate equity, the 
comprehensive business income tax, and combined proposals using CORTAX. Section 7 
demonstrates the sensitivity of our findings for a number of parameter choices. Finally, section 
8 concludes.  
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2 Properties of ACE and CBIT 
Most corporate tax systems in the world allow interest to be deductible as expenditure when 
calculating taxable profits. The normal return on equity is usually not deductible as a cost. 
Therefore, corporate tax systems discriminate against equity finance. It will cause higher debt 
shares by firms seeking the lowest cost of finance. This creates distortions in the risk profile of 
asset portfolios. Moreover, because young and innovative firms usually face more severe credit 
restrictions on credit markets, the tax favoured status of debt favours mature firms over start 
ups. Tax arbitrage also erodes the corporate tax base, all the more because firms today use 
hybrid capital structures where equity is classified as debt in the tax accounts, while in fact, it 
has many properties of equity. To avoid distortions and arbitrage, governments have introduced 
complicated anti-avoidance regulation and thin capitalization rules. A more straightforward 
alternative is to implement a more neutral treatment of debt and equity by means of an 
allowance for corporate equity (henceforth: ACE) or a comprehensive business income tax 
(henceforth: CBIT).  
2.1 Financial distortions 
How important is tax discrimination for a firms’ financial policy? And what will be its welfare 
cost? The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that the debt-asset ratio will have no impact on the 
value of a corporation under certain conditions. Hence, tax-induced distortions might be 
immaterial. At the same time, Myers stated in his presidential address to the American Finance 
Association in 1984: “I know of no study clearly demonstrating that a firm’s tax status has 
predictable, material effects on its debt policy”. The two statements suggest that financial 
distortions are either unimportant or absent. More recent literature has challenged both the 
irrelevance theorem of Modigliani-Miller and the irrelevance of taxation for financial structure 
suggested by Myres.  
First, there are several reasons why capital structure matters for efficiency. For instance, a 
high debt-asset ratio may increase the probability of bankruptcy and thus create a cost of 
financial distress. Moreover, asymmetric information between managers and shareholders 
create potentially high agency costs, which may be reduced if the firm increases its debt ratio. 
Indeed, debt may act as a disciplining device to managers and thus reduce the monitoring costs 
of shareholders. According to the pecking-order theory, a firms’ financial policy has also a 
signalling effect in the presence of information asymmetry, namely about the value of the firm. 
Intuitively, equity issues might give a signal to the market that the firm is overvalued, thereby 
causing a decline in share values. To avoid such signals, firms find it attractive to finance 
investment by retained earnings, otherwise use debt, and only issue new shares as a final source 
of funds. Overall, financial theories thus suggest that several non-tax factors influence optimal 
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capital structures. Deviating from these structures due to tax discrimination may therefore cause 
adverse welfare implications (see e.g. Weichenrieder and Klautke, 2008). 
Empirical studies since Myres’ statement have reported several significant relationships 
between tax differentials and financial structures. For instance, a recent review of studies by 
Weichenrieder and Klautke (2008) concludes that ‘from today’s point of view, empirical studies 
reveal a measurable, abeit moderate effect on the capital structure’ (p. 13). They suggest that an 
increase in the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points will increase the debt-asset ratio by 
between 1.4 and 4.6 percentage points.  
Both the welfare costs of financial distortions and empirical support for the impact of 
taxation on capital structure provide arguments for considering more neutral systems, i.e. the 
ACE and CBIT. 
2.2 Allowance for corporate equity 
The ACE system was originally proposed in 1991 by the Capital Taxes Committee of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS, 1991, Devereux and Freeman, 1991). It was based on an earlier 
idea of Boadway and Bruce (1984), who suggested an allowance for corporate capital (ACC). 
Their idea was to abolish the deductibility of actual interest payments and to replace it by an 
allowance of the normal return, applied to the book value of all the firm’s capital according to 
the tax accounts. The ACE is slightly different in that it maintains the current deductibility of 
actual interest payments. It adds to this a notional return on equity to be deductible against 
corporate profits. Since the tax advantage associated with the deduction for equity is certain, the 
appropriate notional return of the ACE is the risk-free nominal interest rate, e.g. the rate on 
government bonds (Bond and Devereux, 1995). 
2.2.1 Properties of the ACE 
The ACE is known to have several attractive features. First, it obtains neutrality between debt 
and equity finance. Thus the ACE makes thin capitalization rules redundant.  
A second property of the ACE is that it is neutral with respect to marginal investment 
decisions. By allowing a deduction for both interest and the normal rate of return on equity, the 
ACE system leaves capital income untaxed. It thus reflects a tax on economic rents and no tax 
is charged on projects with a return that matches the cost of capital. Investment behaviour at the 
margin is therefore not affected.  
A third property of the ACE is that it offsets investment distortions induced by differences 
between economic depreciation and depreciation for tax purposes. In particular, an increase in 
accelerated depreciation for tax purposes will reduce the book value of assets in the tax 
accounts, thereby also reducing the ACE in later years. This exactly offsets the benefits from 
earlier depreciation in present value terms. Indeed, the present value of the sum of the 
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depreciation allowance and the ACE allowance is independent of the rate at which firms write 
down their assets in the tax accounts.  
While the ACE system is more neutral than current corporate tax systems to investment and 
to its financial structure, it has some potential drawbacks too. First, the narrower tax base 
implies a reduction in corporate tax revenue under an ACE as compared to current systems. It 
thus requires higher taxes elsewhere to balance the government budget. One obvious candidate 
to make up for the lost revenue is an increase in the corporate tax rate. The ACE would then 
shift the tax burden from the marginal return to capital towards economic rents. In a closed 
economy that features a perfect capital market, this renders the tax system non-distortionary. 
Indeed, higher corporate tax rates under an ACE leave investment unaffected. However, to the 
extent that economies are open, rents can be mobile. For instance, firm-specific rents associated 
with brand names or patents may well move across international borders. In that case, the shift 
from capital to rents will affect the location of production (Bond, 2000; Devereux and Griffith, 
1998).  
Profit taxes may also affect real investment decisions if firms face credit constraints. These 
constraints can arise from asymmetric information between creditors and investors on capital 
markets, e.g. about the risk of investment projects. Banks and investors usually have less 
information than firms about the chance that an investment project will yield a sufficiently high 
rate of return and will be reluctant to provide credit. This applies in particular to new and 
innovative firms who do not yet have a reputation. If such firms cannot obtain credit from banks 
or investors, they rely on retained earnings as a source of finance for new investments. A lower 
corporate income tax rate will increase the cash-flow and improve the liquidity position of 
firms. It allows them to finance more investments from retained earnings. Empirical evidence 
provides support for the impact of net internal funds on investments (see Hubbard, 1997, for an 
overview), suggesting that corporate taxes not only affect investment at the margin, but also 
inframarginal investment due to capital-market imperfections.  
The ACE may also be unattractive in light of international profit shifting. Multinational 
firms have a variety of options to shift profits across their affiliates through tax planning 
activities. The incentives for international profit shifting are determined by differences in 
statutory tax rates. If an ACE is financed by an increase in these statutory tax rates, the 
government may lose revenue due to profit shifting towards other countries. Note that the ACE 
is not necessarily financed by an increase in the corporate tax rate. In particular, the ACE moves 
the tax system towards a consumption-based tax. A further increase in the tax on consumption 
may therefore be a natural candidate as well to cover the revenue cost of the ACE. The 
economic effects of an ACE may be markedly different under such an alternative way of 
balancing the government budget. 
Tax planning via intracompany loans might change as well. Since debt and equity are 
treated similarly under an ACE, multinationals no longer have an incentive to adjust their 
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intracompany debt-equity structures if all countries would adopt such a system. However, if 
only one country adopts an ACE, multinationals may find it attractive to locate their equity in 
that location since returns will be at least partly untaxed. As long as dividend repatriations will 
be exempt in the parent country, it renders it particularly attractive for multinationals to channel 
equity to the ACE country and reduce its tax liability. 
The short-run budgetary cost of an ACE system can be large if the notional interest 
deduction is applied to both new and existing capital. For existing capital, the allowance is 
simply a windfall gain. To limit this cost, the government may apply the ACE only to new 
investment. Still, in the long-term all capital will benefit from the ACE, so this is mainly an 
issue of transition. Table 2.1 summarises the main properties of an ACE system. 
Table 2.1 Expected impact of ACE on decision margins 
Effects of ACE on distortions in  
- Capital structure Neutralised 
- Marginal investments Neutralised 
- Fiscal depreciation Neutralised 
- Tax planning via intragroup financial structure  Increased equity finance in ACE country 
Effects of corporate tax rate increase on  
- Investment by credit constrained firms Reduced investment 
- Discrete location of profitable investment  Reduced investment 
- Tax planning via transfer pricing Outflow of profits 
 
 
2.2.2 Experience with ACE systems 
There are a number of experiences with ACE-type reforms in various countries, although each 
of these experiences had its own special properties. The ACE experiences refer to Austria, 
Croatia, Italy, Brazil and recently Belgium (see Klemm, 2007 for an overview). We discuss 
these regimes and economic assessments thereof briefly. 
Italy 
Between 1997 and 2003, Italy applied what they called a dual income tax (DIT) system, a 
restricted version of the ACE. In particular, a reduced corporate income tax rate (19% instead of 
37%) was applied to notional interest for post-reform equity stocks. Hence, the notional return 
on capital already installed was not subject to the reduced rate, which clearly mitigated the 
short-term budgetary cost of the Italian DIT (which would have been a windfall gain for 
equity). The notional rate started off at 7% and was applied to the book value of new equity. In 
2000 and 2001, the book value was raised to 120% and 140% of the new equity stock, 
respectively, in order to converge more quickly to a system where the entire capital stock is 
counted. In 2002, it was cut back again to 100%. Until 2001, Italy applied a minimal average 
tax burden of 27%, i.e. an average of the reduced and the high rate. In 2001, the notional rate 
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was reduced from 7 to 6%. In 2004, Italy abolished the DIT and reduced its statutory corporate 
tax rate from 37 to 34%.  
At the time that the central Italian government introduced a system with clear features of an 
ACE, local governments in Italy introduced a source-based value added tax. These taxes are 
similar to a CBIT where interest is not deductible, although also wages are taxed at source. The 
considerable amount of changes in the Italian and the offsetting tax reforms of local 
governments make it difficult to identify its economic implications.  
Bordignon et al. (1999) simulate the implications of the Italian reforms and find that it 
indeed reduces the cost of capital in most cases. Moreover, computations of effective tax rates 
by Bordignon et al. (2001) confirm that the reforms reduced the discriminatory impact of taxes 
on financial structures. Staderini (2001) empirically explores the financial structures of Italian 
firms during the DIT period using panel data. His evidence supports of the expected effect on 
debt-asset ratios. Oropallo (2005) explores whether during the Italian DIT the probability of 
firms issuing equity increased. He finds support for this hypothesis for large and profitable 
firms as compared to small and less profitable firms.  
Croatia 
In Croatia, a notional return on equity has been deductible for the corporate income tax between 
1994 and 2000. The notional rate of 5 percent plus inflation was applied to the book value of 
equity. In 2001, Croatia abolished the ACE system when it reduced the corporate tax rate from 
35% to 20%. The Croatian ACE comes close to the textbook version. A comprehensive 
empirical evaluation of its effects is problematic, however, due to a lack of data. Keen and King 
(2002) attempt to make a crude assessment by comparing Croatian developments with those in 
other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They conclude that the Croatian ACE 
seems to have worked out well: corporate tax revenues in terms of GDP appeared to be similar 
to those in other transition countries while foreign direct investment in Croatia was relatively 
high. 
Austria 
Between 2000 and 2004, Austria applied a reduced corporate tax rate of 25% (instead of the 
usual 34%) on the notional return on equity. This return was determined by the book value of 
post-reform equity stocks, multiplied by the average return on government bonds plus 0.8%. 
The system came to an end in 2005 when Austria reduced its corporate tax rate for all profits. 
We are not aware of studies attempting to assess the implications of the Austrian reform. 
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Brazil 
Since 1996 Brazil applies an ACE type system to distributed profits. A so-called remuneration 
of equity can be paid as interest and is deductible for the corporate income tax (but subject to 
the usual 15% withholding tax on interest). The remuneration applies to the book value of 
equity and the rate is equal to that on long-term loans. As the Brazilian ACE only applies to 
distributed returns and not to retained profits, the effects can be different from a full ACE. 
Klemm (2007) empirically assesses its implications of the Brazilian ACE and finds that it 
reduced debt shares, although not much. Dividend payouts increased, which is expected as 
dividends become more favourably taxed. Klemm’s study is unable to identify clear positive 
effects on investment, but the results suggest that such effects cannot be ruled out either.  
Belgium 
Belgium introduced an ACE in 2006 (see e.g. Gerard, 2006ab). A notional return at the average 
monthly government bond rate (capped at 6.5 percent and 0.5% higher for small and medium-
sized firms) applying to the book value of equity is deductible from the corporate income tax 
base. Using a microsimulation model for Belgium, OECD (2007) estimates the budgetary 
impact of the Belgian ACE at around 10% of the initial corporate tax yield. It is too early to 
draw conclusions about the economic implications of the Belgian ACE. 
 
Overall, the empirical studies on the ACE do not give us clear-cut evidence on its economic 
implications, either because of lack of data or because the ACE was part of a multiple reform 
package, which renders it difficult to identify the impact of the ACE. So, we cannot infer from 
the introduction of ACE-type systems any effects on investment, debt ratios or the economy at 
large. Yet, a potentially important lesson from the experiences is that ACE-type reforms have 
not encountered major difficulties in their implementation, nor did they create outflows of 
foreign capital (Klemm, 2007).  
2.2.3 Lessons from simulation studies 
A number of simulation models have been used to numerically assess the economic 
consequences of the ACE. We summarize these outcomes in Table 2.2.  
First, Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007) use a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to 
assess the ACE as part of a broader reform package in the taxation of capital income in 
Switzerland. They derive household decisions from an overlapping generations framework with 
endogenous labour  supply and an endogenous portfolio composition of savings. At the firm 
side, the model distinguishes between domestically owned corporate and non-corporate firms, 
as well as domestic subsidiaries of home and foreign based multinational firms. Firms 
endogenously determine their debt share, dividend payout and investment behaviour. In the 
simulations, Keuschnigg and Dietz finance the ACE-part by an increase in the value-added tax 
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by 1.5%-points. The first column in Table 2.2 shows their outcomes. It reveals that the reform 
reduces the cost of capital for Swiss firms by 1.5%. This raises investment so that the capital 
stock rises by 7.8%. This comes along with a rise in employment and GDP. The more neutral 
treatment of debt and equity causes a decline in the debt/asset ratio by 3.8%-points. Welfare in 
their analysis is probably best reflected in the rise in private consumption by 1.4%.  
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007) use a computable general equilibrium model for 
Germany called IfoMod to perform a similar experiment as Keuschnigg and Dietz. The model 
describes two countries and is based on an infinitely lived agent who works in either of two 
sectors: a corporate or non-corporate sector. The model describes investment behaviour and 
financial behaviour of these firms. In the simulations, the ACE is financed by a higher value-
added tax rate to balance the budget. The authors find that the ACE is rather costly and requires 
a 5.1%-point increase in the value-added tax rate to balance the budget for the government. The 
cost of capital falls by 6.3%, which causes an increase in investment by more than 20%. GDP 
expands by more than 9% in the long run. Somewhat remarkably, welfare rises by only 0.08%. 
Fehr and Wiegard (1999) use a dynamic Auerbach-Kotlikoff overlapping generations model 
to assess the replacement of the German trade tax – a local tax on business income – by an 
equal revenue ACE. The model describes firm investment behaviour, where adjustment costs 
imply that the economy only moves gradually towards a new steady-state equilibrium. Short-
run effects can be markedly different from the long-run effects. Fehr and Wiegard find that the 
ACE would raise the capital stock in Germany by more than 10% in the long run. It would 
cause an increase in GDP by 2.6%.   
Table 2.2 Simulation outcomes from previous country studies on the ACE 
  Keuschnigg & Dietz 
(2007)a 
Radulescu & 
Stimmelmayr (2007)b 
Fehr & Wiegard 
(1999)c 
Country  Switzerland Germany Germany 
Corporate tax rate Level 23.2 38.3 n.a. 
Value-added tax rate ∆ 1.5 5.1 n.a. 
Cost of capital ∆ − 1.5 n.a. n.a. 
 %∆ n.a. − 6.3 n.a. 
Debt ratio ∆ − 3.8 n.a. n.a. 
Employment %∆ 0.4 1.7 − 0.1 
Capital stock %∆ 7.8 20.5 10.1 
GDP %∆ 2.6 9.1 2.6 
Private consumption %∆ 1.4 4.6 1.0 
Welfare (in % GDP) ∆ n.a. 0.08 0.07 
 a
 We take the results from table 3 of their study, in particular, the difference between the fourth and third column.  
b
 We take the results from the first column of tables 3 and 4 of their study. 
c
 We take the long-term results from Table 4 of their study.  
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2.3 Comprehensive business income tax 
The CBIT seeks to eliminate the favourable fiscal discrimination of debt financed investment 
by disallowing a deduction for interest payments. The CBIT has been proposed by the US 
Treasury (1992). The precise design of CBIT requires careful consideration. In the US treasury 
proposal for a CBIT, a distinction is made between so-called CBIT entities and non-CBIT 
entities. Most firms will be CBIT entities (only small firms will not) who are disallowed interest 
deductibility. The same applies to financial companies, including banks. To avoid double 
taxation of interest, the interest received by firms or banks from other CBIT entities should be 
exempt or credited. The interest that firms or banks receive from non-CBIT entities, however, 
will be subject to tax. It includes interest from households or government bonds. Interest 
received from abroad will be subject to tax, although an exemption or credit can be applied if 
this interest comes from a CBIT entity, e.g. if other countries also introduce a CBIT.  
2.3.1 Properties of CBIT 
CBIT transforms the corporate income tax into a broad-based tax on capital at the level of the 
firm. As all capital income will thus be taxed at source. In the US treasury proposal, CBIT is 
accompanied by an abolition of personal taxes on capital. Thus, it avoids double taxation of 
some sorts of capital income – such as dividends – and broadens the base to currently exempt 
types of capital income – such as that earned by institutional investors.  
A disadvantage of the CBIT is that it raises the cost of capital on debt-financed investments. 
Fewer investment projects will be profitable at the margin so that investment declines. This 
effect is opposite to the ACE. Yet, the broadening of the base under CBIT will raise corporate 
tax revenue. If the overall tax revenue is to be maintained, it allows for a lower corporate tax 
rate. This reduces the cost of capital on equity financed investments and may attract mobile 
economic rents or paper profits of multinationals.3 This is opposite from the ACE: CBIT shifts 
the tax burden away from rents towards the marginal investment return. If mobile rents, credit 
constraints and multinational profit shifting are important relative to marginal investment 
decisions, then the CBIT might be attractive. 
Sorensen (2007) notes that, on balance, the effect is ambiguous: the cost of capital on low-
yielding investments financed by debt will probably rise, leading to lower investments. But 
highly profitable investments financed by equity will be taxed lighter so that these investments 
will expand. According to Bond (2000), the benefits from lower tax rates under CBIT are likely 
to outweigh the costs induced by a higher cost of capital. 
 
3
 Note that the revenue effects of the CBIT depend on what happens to personal taxes. If these are abolished, the combined 
reform of CBIT and personal tax relief may not raise much extra revenue. However, the CBIT most likely requires a low 
corporate tax rate to prevent bankruptcies associated with the transition phase (Sorensen, 2007). It therefore probably will 
yield less revenue. 
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CBIT may also affect intracompany financial policies. If all countries adopt a CBIT system, 
multinationals no longer have an opportunity to shift profits by adjusting their intrafirm capital 
structure. However, if only one single country adopts a CBIT, firms will find it attractive to no 
longer finance investment in that country by debt. Table 2.3 summarises the main properties of 
CBIT. 
Table 2.3 Expected impact of CBIT on decision margins 
Effects of CBIT on distortions in  
- Capital structure Neutralised 
- Marginal investments Exacerbated 
- Tax planning via intragroup financial structure  Reduced debt finance in CBIT country 
Effects of corporate tax rate reduction on  
- Investment by credit constrained firms Increased investment 
- Discrete location of profitable investment  Increased investment 
- Tax planning via transfer pricing Reduced outflow – increased inflow of profits 
 
 
2.3.2 Experience with CBIT-type reforms 
There are no real-world experiments of actual CBIT regimes. Yet, countries do have imposed 
reforms that limit the deductibility of interest in some way, usually through thin-capitalisation 
rules.  
Thin capitalisation rules 
These rules imply that the interest deduction of a company is not deductible from profits if the 
debt-to-equity ratio exceeds a certain threshold. In the US, for instance, interest paid by 
affiliates of non-US owned parents is limited if the debt-to-equity ratio is higher than 1½. 
Today, many countries in Europe adopt thin-capitalisation. Buettner et al. (2008) report that in 
2005 approximately 60% of the European countries had thin-capitalisation in place, which is a 
doubling over the last decade. Between 1996 and 2005, 19 cases are reported where 
governments have tightened existing limitations. Buettner et al. (2008) find that (more 
stringent) thin-capitalisation rules are effective in reducing debt-to-equity ratios. Yet, these 
rules also tend to reduce the level of investment. 
Germany introduced thin-capitalisation rules in 1994, tightened them in 2001 and 2004 and 
replaced it by an earnings-stripping rule in 2008. The latter regime disallows interest 
deductibility above 30% of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation. Weichenrieder and 
Wnidischbauer (2008) analyse the impact of the 2001 reform in Germany and find significant 
effects on the financial structure of corporations. They report a negligible impact on investment. 
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Dutch interest box 
The Netherlands since 1997 had a special regime for the treatment of holding companies. In 
particular, 80% of the income received by Dutch holdings (including interest income), could be 
labelled as ‘provisions’. These provisions were not taxed. Hence, only 20% of the income 
received was subject to Dutch corporate income tax. The Dutch regime for holdings was put on 
the list of harmful tax practices and will now be phased out in 2010. With the fundamental tax 
reform of 2007, the Dutch government proposed a new regime for the treatment of interest, the 
so-called interest box. It offers an option for Dutch multinationals to choose among two regimes 
regarding the tax treatment of interest. Under the ordinary regime, both interest received and 
interest paid is taxed/deducted at the general Dutch corporate tax rate of 25.5%. Under the 
optional interest box, both interest received and interest paid is taxed/deducted at a rate of 5%. 
The regime is not yet implemented as the Dutch government awaits the European Court 
decision about its consistency with EU law.  
The Dutch interest box contains features of a CBIT regime, although interest paid is still 
deductible at a rate of 5%. Three Dutch fiscal scientists have recently proposed to move further 
in the direction of a CBIT in the Netherlands. They suggest to abolish the distinction between 
debt and equity for intragroup transactions altogether by disallowing the deductibility of interest 
and leaving interest received untaxed in the Netherlands (Engelen et al., 2008). It is reminiscent 
to a CBIT for intragroup transactions.  
 
While thin-capitalisation rules or the Dutch interest regime are not the same as a CBIT, they 
have some commonalities. Indeed, thin-capitalisation rules have in common with CBIT that 
interest deductibility is restricted; the Dutch regime has in common that interest is deductible at 
a lower rate. Hence, these developments can be characterised as movements in the direction of 
CBIT. 
2.3.3 Lessons from simulation studies 
The economic effects of a CBIT in Germany have been analyzed with the Infomod model by 
Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007). Table 2.4 summarizes their findings. The revenue from 
base broadening is used to cut the value-added tax rate by 4.3% points. We see that the model 
predicts an increase in the cost of capital by almost 10%, which causes a similar reduction in 
investment. GDP falls by more than 5%, inducing welfare to drop by 0.7% of GDP.  
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Table 2.4 Simulation outcomes on the CBIT in Germany by Radulescu & Stimmelmayr (2007)b 
Corporate tax rate Level 38.3 
Value-added tax rate ∆ − 4.3 
Cost of capital %∆ 9.7 
Employment %∆ − 1.4 
Capital stock %∆ − 10.2 
GDP %∆ − 5.3 
Private consumption %∆ − 4.7 
Welfare (in % GDP) ∆ − 0.7 
 b
 We take the results from the third column of tables 3 and 4 of their study. 
 
2.4 ACE&CBIT combinations 
In principle, reforms in the direction of ACE and CBIT can be combined. For instance, the 
experiments in Italy and Austria involve a reduced corporate tax rate on the normal return to 
equity but no full allowance. Thus, these systems can be characterized as partial ACE systems. 
Similarly, reforms that impose limitations to the deductibility of interest, such as thin 
capitalisation rules or income stripping regulations, can be characterized as partial CBIT 
reforms. Also the Dutch interest box can be characterized as a CBIT-type reform, applying to 
intragroup transactions.  
A combined reform of a partial ACE and a partial CBIT mitigates the discrimination 
between debt and equity from both directions. At the same time, the implications for corporate 
tax revenue are offsetting. Therefore, one can design a reform package of a partial ACE and 
partial CBIT that is revenue neutral for the government and which is still more neutral with 
respect to the financial structure of companies. In the simulations of this study, we will analyse 
such combined ACE&CBIT reforms. 
Determining an optimal combination of ACE and CBIT is a difficult task. Optimality as 
obtained from welfare maximisation may require not only that financial distortions are 
minimised, but also that other distortions of the corporate income tax are reduced, including 
investment distortions, location distortions and tax arbitrage due to profit shifting. The size of 
these distortions typically differs among countries. Thus there will be different optimality rules 
across countries. Moreover, these distortions depend on whether countries design their systems 
unilaterally or multilaterally.  
Economic analysis of optimality conditions might well show that some countries will find it 
optimal to shift the tax burden away from corporations towards other tax bases. For instance, an 
ACE may be introduced and financed by an increase in consumption or labour taxes. 
Alternatively, countries may cut their corporate tax rates and cut back transfers, thereby 
improving efficiency. Whether such policies are indeed socially desirable depends, however, 
not only on efficiency, but also equity issues. A proper analysis of optimality therefore requires 
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a sufficiently rich framework which can assess key trade-offs between equity, efficiency and 
administrative feasibility. It should also incorporate the fundamental reasons why countries 
adopt corporate income taxes in the first place, which is often believed to be the backstop for 
the personal income tax, i.e. to prevent individuals from starting a small incorporated business 
in order to avoid paying tax. Such considerations are beyond the scope of our modelling 
framework. In fact, the CORTAX model discussed in the next section is designed to gain 
insight in the efficiency effects of budgetary neutral tax reform proposals, not for a fully-
fledged optimal tax analysis. Therefore, our conclusions will be silent on the optimality of ACE 
and CBIT reforms, but still provide insight into its economic effects.  
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3 The CORTAX model 
CORTAX is an applied general equilibrium model that describes the 27 countries of the 
European Union, plus the US and Japan. It is designed to simulate the economic implications of 
unilateral and multilateral corporate tax policies. The model is heavily inspired by the 
OECDTAX-model of Sørensen (2001; 2004ab; 2006). An earlier version of CORTAX was 
used for European tax policy analysis in Bettendorf et al. (2006, 2007) and Van der Horst et al. 
(2007). A detailed description of the structure and parameterisation of the model can be found 
in Bettendorf and van der Horst (2008).  
This section starts with a demonstration of the general structure of CORTAX in a non-
technical manner in subsection 3.1. Appendix A elaborates in more detail on the model of the 
firm to show how ACE and CBIT reforms will affect firm behaviour. Subsection 3.2 discusses 
the calibration of corporate tax systems while subsection 3.3 focuses on the key elasticities used 
in the model. Subsection 3.4 contains a discussion on methodology, sensitivity analysis and a 
guide how to the read CORTAX outcomes. 
3.1 General overview of CORTAX 
CORTAX describes the economies of 27 European countries, the US and Japan. The structure 
of each country is the same. Countries are linked to each other via trade in goods markets, 
international capital markets and multinational firms. Below, we discuss the model structure of 
each country and the international linkages. 
3.1.1 Households 
Following the overlapping generations model of Diamond, households are assumed to live for 
two periods. One may interpret one period to cover 40 years. We express all variables in annual 
terms to facilitate the interpretation of the outcomes in terms of national accounts data. 
Behaviour within each 40-year period is assumed to be constant.  
Households make their decisions regarding work, consumption and saving by maximizing a 
life-time utility function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. When young (i.e. the first 
period), households choose to allocate their time between leisure and work. When old (i.e. the 
second period) household do not work but only consume. Young households receive after-tax 
wage income and lump-sum transfers. This income at a young age is allocated over 
consumption and savings. Savings are invested in a mix of bonds and stocks, which are 
assumed to be imperfect substitutes and which yield different rates of return. In the second 
period, households are retired. Consumption at old age is financed by the assets saved from the 
first period plus an after-tax rate of return and by lump-sum transfers. Moreover, the older 
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generation is assumed to own the fixed factor used by firms. Therefore, the old receive the 
economic rents.   
Household optimization yields expressions for labour supply, savings and the optimal asset 
portfolio. Asset returns are determined on world markets and we do not explore residence-based 
taxes on capital in this document. Therefore, saving distortions are not affected by the policies 
explored here. The most important distortions in household behaviour are related to the 
consumption/leisure choice. Labour supply behaviour in CORTAX is governed by the usual 
income and substitution effects. In particular, a higher income tends to raise the demand for 
leisure and thus reduces labour supply. A higher wage rate for a given level of income raises the 
price of leisure and thus tends to cause substitution from leisure into consumption. This 
increases labour supply. Most empirical studies suggest that substitution effects dominate 
income effects so that the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply is positive.  
3.1.2 Firms 
We briefly discuss the behaviour of the firm. A more detailed analysis is given in appendix A. 
CORTAX distinguishes between two types of firms: domestic firms and multinationals. One 
representative domestic firm and one representative multinational headquarter is located in each 
country. The multinational owns a subsidiary in each foreign country. With 29 countries in 
CORTAX, we thus have 30 different firms operating in each country, namely the representative 
domestic firm, the representative headquarter and 28 subsidiaries that are owned by the 
headquarters in the other countries.  
Each firm is assumed to maximise its value subject to the accumulation constraints and a 
production function. Thereby, the multinational considers the sum of the values of its 
headquarter and all subsidiaries. The production function features three primary factors: labour, 
capital and a location-specific fixed factor (e.g. land). Labour is immobile across borders and 
wages are determined on national labour markets. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile 
internationally so that the return to capital (after source taxes) is given for each country on the 
world capital market. The location-specific fixed factor is supplied inelastically. Its income 
reflects an economic rent. Rents earned by subsidiaries accrue to the headquarter in the parent 
country, which is assumed to wholly own the subsidiary. The headquarters are assumed to be 
wholly owned by domestic households. It implies that countries can partly export the tax burden 
to households abroad.  
In calibrating the model of the firm, capital and labour parameters are determined by 
national accounts data on labour- and capital income shares. The fixed factor is – somewhat 
arbitrarily – set at 2.5% of value-added in each country. This value ensures that CORTAX 
yields a reasonable value for the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. 
The initial size of subsidiaries in CORTAX is determined by data on bilateral foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stocks. In particular, these stocks determine the size of the fixed factor in each 
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subsidiary. Given the fixed factor, multinationals decide on how much capital and labour to 
employ in each of their foreign subsidiaries. Hence, if corporate tax changes in a certain 
location raise the cost of capital, this will reduce the amount of capital the multinational is 
willing to invest in that location. Thus, inward FDI in that location drops. The FDI response in 
the basic version of CORTAX is thus governed by the EMTR (see below for an extension to 
this approach with inframarginal firm mobility). 
Firms finance their investment by issuing bonds and by retaining earnings (issuing new 
shares is excluded in CORTAX). The optimal financial structure depends on the difference 
between the after-tax cost of debt and equity. A corner solution is ruled out by including a 
financial distress cost associated with high debt positions. The marginal cost of debt finance 
increases in the debt share. 
One important difference between production in a domestic firm and production in a 
multinational firm is that foreign subsidiaries need intermediate inputs in producing output. 
These intermediate inputs are supplied by the parent company. As there is only one 
homogeneous good in the model, the arms-length price for this intermediate input is equal to the 
market price of the numeraire good, i.e. equal to one. However, the parent company can charge 
a transfer price for intra-company deliveries that deviates from this arms-length price. In 
particular, a headquarter company has an incentive to set an artificially low (high) transfer price 
for supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) statutory corporate tax rate. 
In this way, the multinational is able to shift profits from high to low-tax countries, thereby 
reducing its overall tax liability. To ensure an interior solution, we specify a convex cost 
function to capture the costs associated with manipulated transfer pricing. Hence, profit shifting 
to countries with very low corporate tax rates becomes increasingly costly at the margin.  
In CORTAX, profit shifting reduces the distortionary impact of the corporate tax system in 
high-tax countries by offering firms an opportunity to escape these high tax rates. Thus, profit 
shifting reduces the overall cost of capital for multinationals (see also Becker and Riedel, 2008; 
Overesch, 2008). 
3.1.3 Government 
Government behaviour in CORTAX is exogenous, Hence, the government does not optimize its 
policies and we simply modify exogenous tax and expenditure parameters. In performing 
simulations with CORTAX, we keep the government budget balanced, i.e. the government does 
not run a surplus or deficit after a reform. On the revenue-side of the government budget 
constraint, tax revenues consist of indirect taxes on consumption and direct taxes on various 
sources of income: corporate income, labour income, dividends, capital gains and interest. On 
the expenditure side of the constraint, we find government consumption, interest payments on 
public debt and lump-sum transfers. We keep government consumption and public debt 
constant as a fraction of GDP. The initial labour and consumption tax rates are calibrated by 
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using effective taxes computed from tax revenue data reported in European Commission 
(2008). The initial rates determine the distortions induced by changes in labour and 
consumption taxes. The calibration of corporate tax systems is described in section 3.3. 
3.1.4 Equilibrium 
Equilibrium must hold on each market. On the goods market, we assume a homogenous good 
that is traded on a perfectly competitive world market. Thereby, countries cannot exert market 
power so that the terms of trade is fixed. The goods price acts as a numeraire in the model. On 
asset markets, bonds of different origins are perfect substitutes and can be freely traded on 
world markets. Accordingly, the return to these assets is fixed for an individual country. The 
same holds for equity. Debt and equity are, however, imperfect substitutes. The current account 
equals the change in the net foreign asset position for each country (including rest of the world), 
due to Walras law.  
As labour is immobile internationally, wages are determined nationally. In the version of 
CORTAX we use in this paper, the national labour markets are competitive so that wage 
adjustments ensure equality between labour supply and demand. In Bettendorf et al. (2007), we 
explore the importance of labour-market imperfections and involuntary unemployment for the 
implications of tax reforms. Empirical ambiguity on the wage equation for different countries, 
however, made us decide to adopt the competitive model. 
3.1.5 Welfare 
We compute the compensating variation to measure the welfare effects of policy changes. The 
compensating variation is equal to the transfer that should be provided to households to 
maintain their utility at the pre-reform level. A positive compensating variation implies a 
welfare loss, i.e. an excess burden from taxation. In presenting the welfare effects of reforms, 
we put a minus for the compensating variation so that a positive value denotes an increase in 
welfare. We denote this by the welfare effect and express it in terms of GDP. 
The welfare effects of a tax reform differ from the impact on economic aggregates such as 
private consumption or gross domestic product. This is because utility depends also on leisure. 
More employment may raise income, consumption and gross domestic product, but the decline 
in leisure reduces these benefits in terms of welfare. Moreover, an increase in gross domestic 
product may be accompanied by an inflow of foreign capital, the return of which flows to 
foreign owners, rather than domestic residents. It is also why GDP differs from gross national 
income, which is generally perceived to be a better proxy for national welfare. Welfare may 
also be affected by multinational profit shifting which raises income but leaves the gross 
domestic product unchanged.  
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3.2 Extensions: tax havens and discrete location 
In debates on ACE and CBIT, a crucial element is the distortionary impact of high statutory 
corporate tax rates. The basic CORTAX model captures the impact of corporate tax rates on 
transfer price manipulation of multinationals among the 29 countries. Yet, this may 
underestimate the extent to which high corporate tax rates erode corporate tax bases. The reason 
is first that high tax rates may affect the discrete location of profitable investment by 
multinationals. Recent literature stresses that this decision margin is relevant. Second, 
CORTAX ignores profit shifting vis a vis countries outside the group of 29, most notably 
outside tax havens. To capture these two mechanisms, we extend CORTAX by modelling 
outside tax havens and discrete location choices. This section discusses the main features of 
these two extensions. Appendix A shows the underlying theoretical assumptions in more detail. 
3.2.1 Outside tax havens 
Profit shifting in the basic version of CORTAX occurs via transfer pricing within multinational 
groups in the 29 countries in the model. This profit shifting is proportional to initial FDI stocks. 
Yet, not all forms of profit shifting are linked to FDI. Indeed, multinationals have a variety of 
other ways to shift profits to low-tax locations, such as via royalty payments or cost and income 
allocations. Moreover, CORTAX does not model tax planning via intrafirm capital structures. 
Still, this channel of profit shifting may be affected by ACE and CBIT reforms, as discussed in 
section 2. Profit shifting will also not be restricted to the 29 countries modelled in CORTAX. 
Especially shifting to outside tax havens might be relevant in practice.  
To remedy some of these shortcomings of CORTAX in simulating ACE and CBIT reforms, 
we introduce a simple but straightforward extension of CORTAX by modelling an outside tax 
haven. The idea is that multinationals face an extra decision margin, namely how much effort to 
put in shifting profits to the tax haven. On the one hand, these efforts create a cost for the 
multinational, e.g. to set up a tax haven subsidiary, deal with tax haven authorities and settle 
possible disputes with the home fiscal authority. These costs are assumed to increase in a 
convex way with the tax differential vis a vis the tax haven. On the other hand, profit shifting 
yields a benefit to the firm that is proportional to the difference between the statutory corporate 
tax rate in the country where it operates and the corporate tax rate in the outside tax haven. This 
benefit is a proportional reduction in the tax base in the home country of the company. In the 
optimum, multinationals set the marginal benefit from profit shifting equal to its marginal cost. 
The inclusion of a tax haven implies that a higher corporate tax rate in a country induces a 
larger erosion of its corporate tax base via more substantial profit shifting.4 
 
4
 .  
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3.2.2 Discrete location 
In the basic version of CORTAX, FDI responds only to the EMTR. In particular, the fixed 
factors that create economic rents for multinationals are assumed to be location-specific. Thus, 
multinationals have no opportunity to move these factors to another country in response to 
taxes. Yet, the literature on firm mobility argues that companies can move entire plants to other 
jurisdictions in response to tax, i.e. it emphasises the inframarginal character of location 
decisions (see e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Becker and Fuest, 2005). These studies focus 
on economic rents that are not due to location-specific fixed factors but due to firms-specific 
capital, e.g. brand names, patents, market power and the like. Firm-specific rents may be earned 
and taxed everywhere and may thus move across borders. Accordingly, taxes on these rents 
may affect the location of capital. Empirical evidence supports this view by showing that 
effective average tax rates have larger and more robust impacts on FDI than effective marginal 
tax rates (see e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Devereux and Lockwood, 2006; De Mooij and 
Ederveen, 2008).  
To capture the impact of taxes on location in CORTAX, we provide a straightforward 
extension. In particular, we make the size of the fixed factor owned by multinationals in each 
location dependent on the statutory tax rate. Indeed, it is the statutory tax rate that determines 
the tax burden on economic rents. Together with the effect of effective marginal tax rates that is 
captured in the basic version of CORTAX, the model captures the effect of corporate taxes on 
both marginal and discrete location choices. It is thus consistent with studies emphasising that 
the effective average tax rate influences FDI.5  
In modelling the impact of tax rates on the location choice of multinationals, we assume that 
the firm-specific fixed factor of multinationals is fixed within the European Union, but it is not 
fixed for an individual country. Hence, non-European multinationals will invest in Europe, 
irrespective of the tax on rents, but the precise location within Europe is responsive to tax. The 
firm-specific rents are thus mobile within the EU but not between Europe and other parts of the 
world. One motivation for this assumption is that Europe is a relatively closed market where 
multinationals need to be present, irrespective of tax.  
3.3 Calibration of corporate tax systems 
CORTAX is calibrated for the 27 Member States of the European Union plus the US and Japan. 
We use data for 2005 to replicate national aggregates from national accounts data, such as 
consumption shares, labour-income shares, the average number of hours worked and foreign 
direct investment. A full description of the calibration process is given in Van der Horst et al. 
(2008). Here, we concentrate on parts of the calibration that are crucial for the outcomes of 
 
5
 The effective average tax rate (EATR) can be computed as a weighted average of the effective marginal tax and the 
statutory tax (Devereux and Griffith, 2003). 
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ACE and CBIT reforms. In the calibration of CORTAX, we make extensive use of the ORBIS 
database. More information about ORBIS can be found in e.g. Devereux and Loretz (2008). 
The initial structure of corporate tax systems plays an important role for the outcomes of tax 
reforms. The model is calibrated on tax data for 2005. In the baseline of the model, we simulate 
corporate tax changes in 2006 and 2007. The reforms explored in this study are therefore 
imposed relative to the corporate tax systems in Europe in 2007. For that reason, we present 
data on corporate tax systems for the year 2007 in this section. 
3.3.1 Corporate tax rates 
Figure 3.1 shows the statutory corporate tax rates in Europe in 2007. These rates include local 
taxes and surtaxes that some countries have adopted. The unweighted average in the EU is 24% 
(compared to almost 26% in 2005). We see from Figure 3.1 that the variation across countries is 
large, with rates ranging from a low 10% in Cyprus and Bulgaria to over 35% in Germany and 
Italy. Overall, corporate tax rates are relatively high in the older member states of the EU and in 
Malta and relatively low in the new member states and Ireland. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Corporate tax rates in EU countries, 2007 
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Source: Taxation trends in the European Union, European Commission 2008 edition. Rates include surcharges and local 
taxes. 
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3.3.2 Fiscal depreciation 
There is substantial variation in tax bases across European countries, partly due to differences in 
fiscal depreciation schemes and inventory valuations. Table 3.1 summarizes this information, 
based on the tax laws in 2007.6 
Table 3.1 Depreciation schemes and inventory valuation in corporate tax systems in the EU, 2007a 
Country Buildings Machinery Intangibles Inventory valuation 
     
Austria SL 3%  SL 14.3% SL 12.5% LIFO 
Belgium DB 10%,  SL 5% DB 40% SL 20% SL 20% LIFO 
Bulgaria SL 4% SL 15% SL 25% LIFO 
Cyprus SL 4% SL 10% SL 8% FIFO 
Czech Republic DB 30 years  DB 10 years SL 16.7% average 
Germany SL 3% DB 30%, SL 10% SL 20% LIFO 
Denmark SL 5% DB 25% SL 100% FIFO 
Spain SL 3% DB 24% SL 5% LIFO 
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Finland DB 7% DB 25% SL 10% FIFO 
France SL 5% DB 32.2% SL 20% average 
United Kingdom SL 4% DB 25% DB 25% FIFO 
Greece SL 8% SL 14.3% SL 10% LIFO 
Hungary SL 2% SL 14.3%  SL 8% average 
Ireland SL 4% SL 12.5% SL 10% average 
Italy SL 5% SL 10% SL 33.3% LIFO 
Lithuania DB 25% DB 40% DB 66.7% FIFO 
Luxembourg SL 4% DB 30% SL 20% LIFO 
Latvia DB 10% DB 40% SL 20% average 
Malta SL 10%, SL 2% SL 20% SL 8% LIFO 
Netherlands SL 3% DB 30% SL 10% LIFO 
Poland SL 2.5% SL 10% SL 20% LIFO 
Portugal SL 5% DB 31.3%  SL 10% LIFO 
Romania SL 2.5% SL 50%, SL 8.3% SL 50%, SL 5.5% average 
Slovak Republic DB 20 years DB 6 years SL 20% average 
Slovenia SL 3% SL 20% SL 10% LIFO 
Sweden SL 4% DB 30% SL 20% DB 30%, SL 16.3% FIFO 
 a
 SL denotes a straight line depreciation and DB a declining balance system. Where a switch between declining balance and straight line 
is possible, or where there are more than one rate of depreciation we provide both rates. 
 
 
6
 Compared to 2005, the value of both first-year tax depreciation and depreciation in subsequent years has slightly dropped 
in the EU. As these changes are included in our baseline between 2005 and 2007, we only present data for 2
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Table 3.1 shows that there is substantial variation in the rates and systems of depreciation. 
This is less true for industrial buildings where a large number of countries allow for straight line 
depreciation with rates between 3 and 5 percent. In contrast, plant and machinery is more often 
allowed to be deprecated according to a declining balance schedule with rates between 25 and 
40 percent. The depreciation rules for intangibles, which we measure through the deprecation 
rules for a patent, vary most with a spread from 5 percent straight line in Spain to immediate 
expensing in Denmark. A noteworthy exception is Estonia with its distribution tax only 
applicable on paid out dividends. For this reason, there is no depreciation scheme applicable as 
a tax base definition is not needed.  
With the information contained in Table 3.1, we compute for each asset the net present 
value of the depreciation allowances as a percentage of the purchase price of investment. This 
value indicates how generous fiscal depreciation rules are for that particular asset. Using asset 
shares, we can also compute a weighted average of these values over all assets. In principle, 
asset structures differ across firms. Using firm-specific information from ORBIS, we can thus 
calculate for each individual firm the net present value of its fiscal depreciation allowances. For 
CORTAX, we use the country averages, which are reported in Table 3.2, along with the value 
of first-year tax depreciation. The net present values of allowances vary from 28.79 percent in 
Malta to almost fifty percent in Lithuania. Most countries lie in a range between 33 and 46 
percent.  
The values in Table 3.2 form the basis for the calibration of CORTAX. Thereby, we modify the 
tax base indicator for two countries: Estonia and Belgium. Belgium introduced in 2006 the ACE 
system. As we include reforms up to 2007, our baseline captures this Belgium ACE. In Estonia, 
the value of fiscal depreciation is zero as no depreciation allowances are available. However, 
Estonia does not tax retained profits. Indeed, it only levies a 22% tax rate on profit distributions. 
Hence, corporate profits in Estonia go untaxed as long as they are not repatriated to the parent 
or distributed to shareholders. To correct for this special feature of the Estonian tax system, we 
modify its corporate tax base by assuming a positive allowance. It is set so as to replicate the 
corporate-tax-to-gdp ratio for Estonia. We maintain the Estonian corporate tax rate at 22%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
Table 3.2  Summary information about the NPV of fiscal depreciation schemes in % of the purchase price 
Country First year tax depreciation Net present value of allowances 
   
Austria 5.31% 36.83% 
Belgium 13.50% 44.37% 
Bulgaria 6.14% 39.93% 
Cyprus 4.33% 41.78% 
Czech Republic 4.32% 39.26% 
Germany 8.80% 35.67% 
Denmark 13.45% 45.72% 
Spain 6.24% 32.95% 
Estonia 0.00% 0.00% 
Finland 8.80% 40.46% 
France 9.64% 40.07% 
United Kingdom 8.41% 39.28% 
Greece  6.01% 41.09% 
Hungary 5.19% 35.32% 
Ireland 4.32% 35.79% 
Italy 5.98% 38.04% 
Lithuania 19.43% 49.53% 
Luxembourg 9.45% 39.35% 
Latvia 15.73% 46.17% 
Malta 6.87% 28.79% 
Netherlands 8.01% 35.70% 
Poland 4.52% 37.41% 
Portugal 10.48% 39.63% 
Romania 20.18% 43.65% 
Slovak Republic 6.81% 44.30% 
Slovenia 8.65% 46.01% 
Sweden 9.57% 39.68% 
   
Weighted average EU 7.61% 37.87% 
  
3.3.3 Effective marginal tax rates 
In CORTAX, the effect of corporate taxation on investment is determined by the cost of capital. 
How corporate taxes affect the cost of capital is measured by the effective marginal tax rate 
(EMTR). It is defined as the difference in the cost of capital in the presence and in the absence 
of tax, in percentage of the tax-inclusive cost of capital. The EMTR depends on various 
parameters in the corporate tax system, such as depreciation allowances, inventory valuations, 
depreciation of financial costs and the statutory tax rate. Its value is positive if corporate taxes 
raise the cost of capital and vice versa (see Box “The user cost of capital and the EMTR“). 
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The user cost of capital and the EMTR 
The impact of corporate taxes on the user cost of capital depends on the initial corporate tax system. Tthis effect is best 
reflected by considering a simple tax system. Assuming equity-financed investment, the cost of capital (c) depends on 
the corporate tax (τ) in the following way 
)(
1
1 δ
τ
τ
+
−
−
= r
A
c   
where A denotes the net present value of depreciation allowances in percent of the cost of an investment and r+δ is the 
pre-tax cost of capital. This expression shows that the corporate tax rate exerts no effect on the cost of capital if A = 1, 
which is the case under a cash-flow tax. Intuitively, the cash-flow tax turns the corporate tax into a tax on economic rent 
which is non-distortionary for investment. The smaller the tax allowances become (i.e. the smaller A), the more 
corporate taxes raise the cost of capital.  
From the definition of the EMTR, we derive a direct relationship between the EMTR and the statutory corporate tax rate 
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This expression shows the positive relationship between the statutory corporate tax rate and the EMTR. This effect  also 
depends on A. If A = 1, the EMTR is zero irrespective of the rate of corporate tax. It reflects the non-distortionary 
character of the corporate tax in this case. The lower A, the more τ raises the EMTR, i.e. the more distortionary the 
corporate tax rate becomes for investment. If A = 0, the EMTR equals the statutory corporate tax rate.  
 
CORTAX computes the EMTR for each country separately for debt-financed and equity-
financed investment. As nominal interest is deductible for the corporate tax base and fiscal 
depreciation is typically more generous than economic depreciation, the EMTR for debt-
financed investment is usually negative. Hence, if we would assume that marginal investment is 
financed by debt, higher corporate taxes would stimulate investment as they increase the 
marginal subsidy. The EMTR for equity financed investment is positive since the cost of equity 
finance is not deductible from the corporate tax base. Hence, to the extent that marginal 
investments are financed by equity, higher corporate tax rates will reduce investment. The 
assumptions regarding the marginal source of finance are therefore crucial for the distortionary 
impact of corporate taxes on investment. We follow the convention in computations of EMTR’s 
by assuming a certain marginal debt/asset ratio for each country. In this way, we compute a 
weighted average of the EMTRs for debt and equity finance as a summary indicator of how 
distortionary the corporate tax system is for marginal investment decisions. As we have no 
information about marginal debt-asset ratio’s for new investments, we take average debt shares 
as a proxy for marginal shares. Figure 3.2 shows these averages per country, which are based on 
the ORBIS database. These average debt shares are used in the calibration of CORTAX. 
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Figure 3.2 Average debt-asset ratio of firms in EU countries, 2007 
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Source: Country averages obtained from the ORBIS database 
 
The average debt/asset ratio in Figure 3.2 lies between a low 0.4 in Luxembourg and a high 
0.67 in Italy. The ratio is positively correlated with statutory corporate tax rates (correlation 
coefficient of 0.5). It may reflect that multinationals finance their investments in high-tax 
countries by relatively high shares of debt. In particular, headquarters investing in subsidiaries 
abroad can choose between debt and equity finance. The tax burden on the income earned 
depends on the choice of finance. When financed by debt, the interest is deductible for the 
subsidiary in the host country and taxed in the home country of the parent. When financed by 
equity, the dividend of the subsidiary is taxed at the rate of the host country and repatriated 
dividends are untaxed in the country of the parent if that country uses an exemption system 
(which is the case in continental Europe). To minimize the tax liability, a parent company will 
therefore prefer debt finance for subsidiaries located in high-tax countries and equity finance for 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries.  
The average values of the EMTRs are presented in Figure 3.3. The Belgium EMTR is 
negative, which is due to the Belgian ACE. In other countries, the EMTR is positive and ranges 
between a low 0.25% in Estonia to a high 15% in Malta. In general, the EMTR is relatively 
high in the old EU countries and low in the new member states. 
 33 
Figure 3.3 Average EMTR in EU countries, 2007 
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Source: CORTAX computations 
 
3.3.4 Corporate tax revenue 
CORTAX predicts corporate tax revenues in each EU country. In determining the corporate tax 
base, we use national accounts data on gross value added minus total labour income, thereby 
correcting for the income from the self employed. The share of economic rents is set at 2.5% of 
value added. Regarding deductible costs, we use capital shares from national accounts, fiscal 
depreciation rates from Table 3.2, a nominal interest rate of 4.5% (real rate of 2% and 2.5% 
inflation) and debt shares from Figure 3.2. Figure 3.4 shows the corporate tax-to-gdp ratios 
predicted by CORTAX for 2005. They are compared to actual revenue data for 2005 as reported 
by the European Commission. 
On average, CORTAX predicts a corporate tax-to-gdp ratio of 3.7 in 2005. The data for 
2005 suggest a ratio of 3.0. Hence, CORTAX overestimates corporate tax revenue by 23%. One 
reason for this may be that CORTAX assigns a too large share of capital income to the 
corporate tax base while in practice part of this is taxed under the personal income tax as firms 
are not incorporated. Another reason may be that CORTAX underestimates profit shifting from 
the European Union to outside tax havens. 
The difference between predicted and actual corporate tax-to-GDP ratios in Figure 3.4 are 
positively correlated with statutory corporate tax rates (correlation coefficient 0.58). Hence, for 
countries with low statutory corporate tax rates (Cyprus, Bulgaria, Ireland) the model predicts 
too low corporate tax-to-gdp ratios. For countries with high corporate tax rates (Germany, Italy, 
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Spain and Malta), the model predicts too high corporate tax-to-gdp ratios. It feeds the suspicion 
that the model insufficiently captures profit shifting from high to low tax countries. 
Figure 3.4 Corporate tax revenue in % of GDP according to CORTAX and data 2005 
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Source: Taxation trends in the European Union, European Commission, 2008 edition (Table C.3.1.1) and CORTAX.  
 
3.4 Calibration of key elasticities 
An important part of the calibration of CORTAX involves parameters that determine the key 
elasticities in the model. This section discusses how we choose these parameters and how 
elasticities compare to empirical evidence. In presenting the elasticity values for countries in 
CORTAX, we do not report data for Luxembourg which is typically a severe outlier due to its 
deviating economic structure. 
3.4.1 Labour-supply distortions 
Taxes on income and consumption distort labour supply incentives. These effects are 
determined by the substitution elasticities in the utility function of households, together with 
preference parameters. For all countries, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between 
consumption and leisure is set at 1.0; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at 0.5. 
The preference parameters for leisure are chosen so as to replicate data on the average hours per 
worker in EU countries. On average across the EU, the uncompensated elasticity of labour 
supply is 0.19, which corresponds to the consensus in the empirical literature (see e.g. Evers et 
al., 2008). 
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3.4.2 Financial distortions 
In CORTAX, the convexity of the financial distress cost determines the impact of corporate 
taxation is on a firms’ financial policy. A number of studies aim to identify this impact. Graham 
(2004) reviews earlier studies using time series data and concludes that most report small tax 
effects. More recent studies using cross-section variation between companies typically report 
larger effects. For instance, Gordon and Lee (2001) find that a 1%-point reduction in the 
corporate tax rate reduces the debt/asset ratio at the margin by 0.36%-point. Another strand of 
this literature has explored the impact of taxation on the financial policies of multinationals, 
thereby using cross-country variation in tax rates. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) report a semi-
elasticity of − 0.4. Desai et al. (2003) arrive at a semi-elasticity of − 0.25. In CORTAX, we set 
the parameters in the financial distress cost function so as to obtain a semi-elasticity of the debt 
share with respect to the corporate tax rate between 0.2 and 0.4. The mean value is 0.27. As the 
financial distress cost is a convex function of the debt share, the semi-elasticity falls in the 
corporate tax rate. Figure 3.5 shows this by presenting the elasticity of the debt share for all EU 
countries (each point representing a country).  
Figure 3.5 Reduced-form elasticities of the debt share with respect to the corporate tax rate in CORTAX 
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Source: CORTAX, 26 European countries, excluding Luxembourg 
 
3.4.3 Investment distortions 
To determine the size of corporate tax distortions on investment, we need to quantify two 
effects: (i) the impact of the corporate tax on the cost of capital and (ii) the impact of the cost of 
capital on investment. The effect of corporate taxes on the user cost of capital depends on the 
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initial corporate tax system, as explained in the box on “The cost of capital and the EMTR”. 
The second effect depends on the substitution elasticity between labour and capital. The US 
Joint Committee on Taxation (1997) reports a range of estimated elasticities in the literature 
between 0.2 and 1.0. Chirinko (2002) reviews recent empirical literature and concludes that a 
value of 0.4 is a central estimate for this elasticity, although he proposes a sensitivity analysis 
with values up to 0.6. Most general equilibrium models adopt slightly higher values, somewhere 
between 0.5 and 1.0. We use a value of 0.7 in the baseline simulations. This corresponds with 
an elasticity of investment to the user cost of − 0.9. Direct estimates on the elasticity of 
investment with respect to the cost of capital are consistent with this (Hassett and Hubbard, 
2002).  
To summarise the investment distortions induced by corporate taxes, we compute tax-rate 
elasticities of investment in CORTAX. They are depicted in Figure 3.6. On average, the tax-
elasticity is − 0.3, i.e. a 1%-point higher corporate tax rate reduces investment by 0.3%. It 
ranges from zero in Belgium (due to the ACE system) to − 0.6 in Spain (with a high EMTR). 
Investment thus becomes more responsive to tax if the EMTR in a country is larger. 
Figure 3.6 Reduced-form elasticities of investment with respect to the corporate tax rate in CORTAX 
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3.4.4 Transfer pricing distortions 
The elasticity of transfer pricing with respect to the corporate tax rate is determined by the 
parameters in the convex cost function of transfer price manipulation. There exists some 
evidence on its size. Clausing (2003) exploits intra-firm trade data of US multinationals and 
finds that tax rates have a significant impact on transfer prices. In particular, a 10% point lower 
tax rate in a country results in a reduction in the intrafirm price that an affiliate in that country 
pays by 3 to 5%. In CORTAX, we adopt a somewhat larger tax elasticity of 1.2. The reason is 
that transfer pricing is only one channel that multinationals can use to shift their profits across 
borders. Other channels include income or cost reallocations, loss shifting or modification of 
corporate financial policy. Studies on the aggregate revenue implications of profit shifting 
therefore report more sizeable effects due to profit shifting (see e.g. Devereux, 2006). The 
larger tax elasticity of transfer pricing captures this to some extent. Figure 3.7 shows how the 
tax elasticity of transfer pricing varies with the corporate tax rate. Due to the convex function, it 
becomes increasingly costly at the margin to shift profits to countries that feature a low 
corporate tax rate. Figure 3.7 shows that the tax elasticity ranges between − 0.8 in low-tax 
countries and − 2 in high-tax countries. 
Figure 3.7 Reduced-form elasticities of transfer prices with respect to corporate tax rate in CORTAX 
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Source: CORTAX, 26 European countries, excluding Luxembourg 
 
The extent to which transfer price manipulation affects the corporate tax base of a country 
depends on the size of the intrafirm exports of a countries’ parent and the intrafirm imports of 
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its subsidiaries. In CORTAX, intrafirm trade is proportional to the initial bilateral FDI stocks. 
Figure 3.8 shows these stocks in EU countries as a percentage of GDP. In the figure, we leave 
Luxembourg out because of its exceptional position.7   
We see that the variation across countries is large. The Netherlands stands out with a sum of 
the inward and outward FDI stock of 2.4 times its GDP. Stocks are generally small in Central 
and Eastern Europe, especially the outward stocks. This has important implications for profit 
shifting. For instance, a small change in the transfer price for a Dutch multinational has serious 
implications for corporate tax payments. In contrast, a large change in the transfer price for a 
Romanian multinational will have a negligible impact for corporate tax revenue in Romania. 
Figure 3.8 Inward and outward FDI in % of GDP in EU countries, 2005 
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Source: OECD datastream, 26 European countries, excluding Luxembourg 
 
Together, the elasticity of the transfer price (Figure 3.7) and the size of multinationals (Figure 
3.8) determine the sensitivity of the total corporate tax base for changes in the corporate tax rate 
via transfer price manipulation. We summarize this effect in Figure 3.9, showing the tax 
elasticity of the corporate tax base. A value of − 0.2 means that the corporate tax base shrinks 
by 0.2% due to profit shifting if the corporate tax rate is increased by 1%-point. The average 
value of the tax base elasticity equals − 0.23. Figure 3.9 shows that it is smaller than this for the 
majority of countries as the multinational sector in many countries is relatively small.8 The low 
elasticities in Cyprus and Ireland are due to the small elasticity of the transfer price with respect 
 
7
 Luxembourg features relatively large FDI positions vis a vis other countries. For an average EU country, the total sum of 
the inward and outward stock of FDI is 60% of GDP. The second-largest stock is found in the Netherlands which is 2.4 times 
its GDP. Luxembourg stands out with a stock of 9.4 times its GDP.  
8
 Note that not only the total size of FDI, but also the country where it is located matters for the aggregate elasticity.  
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to the corporate tax rate. For countries where multinationals are important, elasticities are 
larger. The largest elasticities are reported in Belgium and the Netherlands which feature the 
largest multinational sectors. In the Netherlands, a 1%-point higher corporate tax rate reduces 
the tax base via profit shifting by 0.8%.  
Figure 3.9 Reduced-form elasticity of the tax base in % of GDP (due to profit shifting) with respect to the 
corporate tax rate according to CORTAX 
ROMBGR
SVN
SVKPOL
MLT
LTULVA
HUN
EST
AUT
BEL
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
ITA
NLD
PRT
ESP
SWE
GBR
CYPCZE
-0,7
-0,6
-0,5
-0,4
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0
Size of the multinational sector
Ta
x
 
el
as
tic
ity
 
o
f t
he
 
ta
x
 
ba
se
 
du
e 
to
 
pr
o
fit
 
sh
ift
in
g
 
Source: CORTAX, 26 European countries, excluding Luxembourg 
 
3.4.5 Profit shifting to tax havens 
The size of profit shifting to the tax haven is determined by the convexity of the effort cost 
function. We set the parameters such that we obtain a semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base 
of − ½. It implies that a 10%-point tax differential vis a vis the average tax haven reduces the 
corporate tax base by 5%. The calibration is based on two pieces of evidence. First, empirical 
studies on profit shifting typically yield large elasticities of the tax base. For instance, De Mooij 
(2005) reports a tax-rate elasticity of the corporate tax base of − 1.0 on the basis of a selection 
of empirical studies on profit shifting. The elasticity captured by transfer pricing in CORTAX 
implies an average elasticity of approximately − ¼ on average (see Figure 3.9). Adding − ½ 
brings the total magnitude of profit shifting closer to these empirical estimates. A second piece 
of evidence is obtained from the revenue estimates. The predicted corporate tax revenues by 
CORTAX are approximately 1% of GDP higher than the observed revenues in European 
member states. One reason for this might be the underestimation of profit shifting. With the 
calibration of − ½, the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio falls by slightly more than 1% so that 
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CORTAX properly reflects actual tax revenue in the EU. The size of this revenue effect differs 
across countries and depends on the initial corporate tax rate. In particular, the higher the rate, 
the more profits are shifted and the larger is the reduction in tax revenue. Figure 3.10 shows that 
revenues fall up to 2% in high-tax countries like Germany and Italy and with a negligible 
amount in low-tax countries like Cyprus, Bulgaria and Ireland.   
Figure 3.10 Revenue effect of the inclusion of an outside tax haven 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 26 EU countries, excluding Luxembourg 
 
3.4.6 Discrete location 
The impact of corporate taxes on the location of firms can be obtained from two types of 
empirical studies. First, there are studies directly estimating the effect of corporate taxes on 
location, either measured by the probability of location (using micro data) or measured by the 
number of foreign locations (using count data). Second, a number of studies estimate the impact 
of effective average tax rates on foreign capital flows instead of effective marginal tax rates. De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2008) perform a meta analysis of a large number of empirical studies 
found in the literature and arrive at a consensus elasticity for both the extensive investment 
margin, i.e. the discrete location choice, and the intensive investment margin, i.e. the marginal 
investment. For the intensive margin, they report a semi-elasticity of − 4, i.e. a 1%-point 
increase in the effective marginal tax reduces foreign direct investment by 4%. For the 
extensive margin, they report a semi-elasticity of − 2 when measured by the statutory tax rate. 
The combined effect, measured by the semi-elasticity of FDI for the effective average effective 
tax rate is found to be − 6.  
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In the basic version of CORTAX, we only model the impact of the EMTR on FDI. The 
semi-elasticity that is consistent with the parameters in the production function implies a semi-
elasticity of FDI with respect to the EMTR of  − 1½. In the extended version with discrete 
location, we impose a response of fixed capital to the statutory tax rate so as to obtain a semi-
elasticity of FDI with respect to the EATR of − 6, consistent with the outcomes from the meta 
analysis. Hence, in the extended version of CORTAX, the lion share of the impact on FDI is 
determined by effects on discrete location. 
3.5 Methodology and sensitivity 
CORTAX is an attractive tool to analyse corporate tax reforms. Yet, it also suffers from 
limitations that need to be taken into account when interpreting the outcomes. To shed light on 
some of these limitations, we discuss the role of sensitivity analysis . 
3.5.1 Values of CORTAX 
CORTAX is valuable for economic policy analysis as it combines three vital properties: 
theoretical rigour, empirical validity and institutional detail. First, CORTAX encompasses 
several behavioural margins of firms and households, including labour supply choices, saving 
behaviour, investment decisions, financial behaviour, and multinational profit shifting. By 
deriving these behavioural margins from microeconomic optimisation, CORTAX allows for 
easy interpretation of the results and relates macroeconomic outcomes to the underlying 
microeconomic responses of agents. The general equilibrium setting also allows for feedback 
effects of policies through market responses, such as the labour market. Exploring policies in 
such a comprehensive and consistent framework offers potentially important insights for policy 
makers. Indeed, the model forces one to discuss the main assumption that ultimately drive the 
outcomes the model. In this way, it supports communication and helps thinking about the most 
likely implications of policy changes. 
A second valuable property of CORTAX for policy analysis is its empirical validation. 
Various share parameters are set so as to replicate true economic data in the EU. This adds to 
the realism of the model outcomes. Moreover, we use available evidence on the responses at 
various decision margins in the model. This determines the strength of various behavioural 
effects to tax reforms and, therefore, ultimately their economic and welfare effects. It makes 
CORTAX particularly relevant for policy makers as governments typically face trade-offs in 
designing institutions. By quantifying different sides of these trade-offs, it offers input to the 
debate on optimal government policy.  
A third property of CORTAX is its attention to institutional detail. CORTAX pays due 
attention to the corporate tax systems in Europe by distinguishing corporate tax rates, 
alternative fiscal depreciation schemes, immediate expensing, different modes of finance, and 
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opportunities for profit shifting. Especially the combination of CORTAX with information from 
micro data on firm structures in different countries using the ORBIS database provides a unique 
methodology to both the calibration and the design of reforms analysed. 
3.5.2 Limitations of CORTAX 
Despite its values, the methodology adopted in this study also suffers from limitations. In 
particular, while assumptions driving the outcomes of the model are based on the best-possible 
empirical information and widely accepted economic theories, it is still an outcome of a 
simplified description of the real world. Like any CGE model, CORTAX ignores certain 
economic mechanisms, includes specifications that are not undisputed, and it cannot take away 
the uncertainty about the strength of certain behavioural effects to tax policies. For these 
reasons, numerical outcomes should be taken with proper care. It is also why we will perform a 
sensitivity analysis. 
To facilitate a proper assessment of the CORTAX outcomes, we discuss some of its features 
that should be kept in mind when interpreting numbers. The first issue is CORTAX’ treatment 
of risk. The model distinguishes between debt and equity and assumes different rates of return 
for these two assets, which is consistent with ex-post returns in real world observations. The 
equity returns contain a risk premium, however, which forms a compensation for the higher 
uncertainty of equity stakes as compared to risk-free government bonds. CORTAX does not 
explicitly model risk and thus ignores the uncertainty cost of holding equity. In fact, the CES 
function for the asset portfolio of households is an imperfect shortcut to obtain an interior 
solution for household asset portfolios, but does not account for the cost of risk taking.  
A second qualification is that CORTAX does not consider distributional concerns. While 
various taxes in the model thus cause distortions in investment and labour supply, there is no 
explicit underlying distributional reason why the government does this. Indeed, the optimal tax 
structure in the model would be to simply raise lump-sum taxes and eliminate all other taxes. 
One therefore needs to be careful in interpreting simulations where the tax burden is shifted 
from distortionary taxes to lump-sum taxes, or between different distortionary taxes, as this may 
have distributional implications which are overlooked. 
A third issue is that CORTAX assumes one homogenous good. The price of this good is 
determined on a competitive world market on which no country can exert market power. 
Therefore, the terms of trade is fixed for all countries. Large reforms like the ACE and CBIT, 
however, may well affect world markets, especially when the EU implements these reforms 
jointly.  
A fourth point is that CORTAX assumes that the labour market is competitive. This is an 
unrealistic description of European labour-markets, which are characterized by equilibrium 
unemployment. Bettendorf et al. (2007) explore how labour-market imperfections modify the 
impact of corporate tax changes on the economy via its effect on structural unemployment. 
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They find that the cost of capital is an important determinant of the equilibrium unemployment 
rate. Therefore, policies that reduce the cost of capital (like the ACE) can help to fight European 
unemployment. It magnifies the positive welfare impact of these policies. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the parameters determining the impact on equilibrium 
unemployment. In light of this uncertainty, we decided to assume a competitive labour market 
in our analysis of the ACE and CBIT. 
These caveats make us aware of the limitations of the CORTAX simulations. Yet, it also 
shows its value since the consistency of the framework provides common ground for a 
structured discussion about both the assumptions and the economic implications of corporate 
tax reforms. Sensitivity analysis further facilitates this by offering insight in how changes in 
certain assumptions affect the conclusions.  
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We perform a sensitivity analysis to three parameters in CORTAX that determine, respectively, 
the strength of investment responses, the debt-equity choice and multinational profit shifting. 
Moreover, we consider the sensitivity of our results to the size of the fixed factor. For the 
extended model with the outside tax haven and discrete location choice, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis on both of these margins. More specifically, we modify parameters in 
CORTAX in the following way: 
 
• The substitution elasticity between labour and capital in production is reduced from 0.7 to 0.5. 
It is closer to the value proposed by Chirinko (2002).  
• The convexity in the cost function of debt finance is captured by χ0. By raising χ0 from 0.015 to 
0.03, we reduce the tax rate elasticity of the debt share from an average of − 0.27 to − 0.16. It is 
more in line with older studies on the tax effect on corporate finance as reported in Graham 
(2004).  
• The convexity of the cost of transfer price manipulation is captured by εq. We halve εq from 1 to 
0.5, implying that the elasticity of the transfer price with respect to the corporate tax rate falls 
on average from − 1.27 to − 0.28. The latter is consistent with the value reported by Clausing 
(2003).  
• We double the fixed factor from 2.5% of value added to 5%. Empirical evidence on the 
importance of economic rents is not available, which justifies a sensitivity analysis.  
• The elasticity of profit shifting to outside tax havens and discrete location choices is halved in 
the extended version of CORTAX. 
 
The first two sensitivity analyses on the production function and debt policy are explored for 
reforms where the government budget is balanced by changes in the consumption tax rate. The 
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other three sensitivity analyses are applied to a unilateral reform where the government budget 
is balanced ex-ante by changes in the corporate tax rate.  
3.5.4 Reading CORTAX outcomes 
CORTAX computes a new steady state equilibrium after a policy shock, which should be 
interpreted as the long-run effect of the policy change. Reforms always keep the government 
budget constraint balanced by adjusting other taxes or transfers. Government expenditures on 
public consumption or government debt remain unaffected. We concentrate on the following 
selection of variables in presenting CORTAX results: 
• CIT-rate: the statutory corporate tax that is modified in some of the reforms; 
• Rev_cit: the absolute change in corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP; 
• Rev_tax: the change in total tax revenue as a share of GDP, excluding transfers.  
• Debt: Absolute change in the debt / asset ratio; 
• Shift_cit: relative change in the corporate tax base induced by profit shifting; 
• Coc: Absolute change in the cost of capital. It is computed as a weighted average over debt and 
equity financed investment; 
• Wage: relative change in the wage rate paid to domestic employees; 
• Capital: relative change in total capital stock; 
• Employm: relative change in total employment by firms; 
• GDP: relative change in gross domestic product, which comprises the value added from capital, 
labour and the fixed factor, but not that of intermediate inputs in foreign subsidiaries. 
• Welfare: absolute change in compensating variation expressed in % of GDP. It is the transfer 
provided to households to keep utility at the initial level. We put a minus sign for the 
compensating variation so that a positive value reflects a welfare gain. 
 
The tables in appendix B report outcomes for all European countries. In the Figures presented in 
the main text, we do not always report the outcomes for all countries. For instance, Luxembourg 
is regularly an outlier due to its high foreign direct investment stocks, which blurs the main 
message that we want to highlight in the Figures. Belgium is often an outlier as it already has an 
ACE system in place. Estonia has a special regime for retained earnings, which gives 
sometimes different results. For Malta, we sometimes find different results as the country 
combines a high tax rate with a very broad base. 
When we consider common European reforms, we present the impact on European 
averages, which represent GDP-weighted averages. For unilateral reforms, we do not present 
averages in the tables since these would ignore international spillover effects. Indeed, if a single 
country benefits from a certain reform, this may come at the expense of other countries due to 
profit shifting or capital reallocation. When we would compute an average, this ignores such 
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spillovers and wrongly presents it as the average European effect. In the main text, we 
sometimes refer to unweighted averages, which then reflect the impact for a typical or average 
European country.  
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4 ACE reform in CORTAX 
This section discusses simulation outcomes of ACE reforms in CORTAX. We start in section 
4.1 with unilateral reforms where the government balances its budget by an adjustment of lump-
sum transfers or alternative taxes. Section 4.2 compares ACE reforms that are implemented 
separately by single European countries with a joint European reform towards an ACE. Section 
4.3 analyses ACE in extended versions of CORTAX where we model tax havens outside the 
EU and discrete location choices of profitable investment.  
4.1 Unilateral ACE reform in EU countries 
The ACE is modelled as a deduction for the equity share of capital in the tax accounts. We 
apply the nominal interest rate to compute the tax deduction. The simulation outcomes for a 
number of variables and all 27 EU countries are presented in Tables B.1 – B.4 in Appendix B. 
4.1.1 Balanced budget with lump-sum transfers 
By allowing a deduction for equity, ACE implies a narrowing of the corporate tax base which 
reduces corporate tax revenues. The government thus needs other sources of finance to meet its 
revenue requirement. Lump-sum transfers are the most natural starting point as they offset 
income effects. The analysis thus concentrates on the economic and welfare effects of 
substitution effects induced by changed relative prices.   
Figure 4.1 Effect of ACE on corporate tax-to-gdp ratios in CORTAX 
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Source: CORTAX simulations 
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Figure 4.1 shows by how much an ACE reduces corporate tax revenues in EU countries 
according to CORTAX. The black bars reflect the post-reform corporate tax-to-GDP ratio; the 
grey parts reflect the reduction due to the ACE. Together, the bars add up to the current 
corporate tax-to-GDP ratios according to CORTAX. We see that, on average for the EU, the 
corporate tax-to-GDP ratio drops from 3.5 to 1.9, i.e. by around 44%. This decline applies more 
or less to all countries, except for Belgium that already has an ACE. 
Table 4.1 summarises the economic implications of an ACE-system according to CORTAX 
for the GDP-weighted average in the EU. They are the result of two major responses by firms to 
the ACE: an effect on the financial structure of firms and an effect on investment behaviour. 
First, the ACE eliminates the tax-favoured status of debt over equity finance. Thus, it reduces 
the optimal debt share for firms. Table 4.1 suggests that, on average, the debt share falls by 
5.4%.   
Table 4.1 Summary of results of ACE reforms with lump-sum adjustmenta 
  
Corporate tax revenue (ex-post) (% GDP) − 1.6 
Transfers (ex-post) (% GDP) − 0.4 
Debt share (∆) − 5.4 
Cost of capital (∆) − 0.6 
Wage (%) 2.7 
Capital (%) 7.9 
Employment (%) 1.0 
GDP (%) 2.8 
Welfare ((∆ in % GDP) 0.8 
  a
 GDP-weighted averages for EU 27. 
Source: CORTAX simulations 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that, across countries (excluding Belgium), the impact on the debt share 
varies: it ranges between 2.4% in Bulgaria to 8.6% in Malta. The difference can be explained by 
the initial distortion in the financial structure, which is governed by differences in initial 
corporate tax rates. Indeed, the responsiveness of the debt share to the corporate tax declines in 
the corporate tax rate due to the convex agency cost. 
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Figure 4.2 Effect of ACE on debt shares 
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Figure 4.3 Effect of ACE on investment 
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The second effect of the ACE is an expansion of investment by 7.9% on average in the EU. It is 
caused by the reduction in the cost of capital by 0.6%-points, which raises investment 
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incentives. The effects on the cost of capital and investment differ across countries, as shown in 
Figure 4.3: capital expands by more than 10% in Malta, Spain and Germany but by less than 
3% in Bulgaria and Cyprus. The differences are caused by the initial corporate tax systems, i.e. 
differences in corporate tax rates and corporate tax bases. In countries where the corporate tax 
system is more distortionary due small investment allowances and a high corporate tax rate, the 
ACE has more potential to reduce the cost of capital and to boost investment. Figure 4.3 shows 
that the corporate tax rate is a good proxy of the initial distortion. 
The expansion of investment in light of the ACE has implications for the rest of the 
economy. The larger capital stock raises the productivity of labour. Firms will therefore 
increase their labour demand. This requires higher wages to stimulate workers to supply more 
labour as the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply is positive. The expansion of 
investment and employment increase GDP by 2.8% on average in the EU. Figure 4.4 shows that 
this GDP-effect ranges between approximately 1% in Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania to more 
than 4% in Spain, Malta and Germany. Clearly, there is a positive correlation between the 
expansion of GDP and the initial corporate tax rate of a country.  
The expansion in capital, employment, wages and GDP imply that the ex-post revenue cost 
of the ACE are considerably smaller than the initial decline in corporate tax revenue. Indeed, 
while corporate tax revenue fall by 1.6% of GDP, the ex-post reduction in total tax revenue (and 
thus the necessary ex-post reduction in lump-sum transfers) is only 0.4% of GDP. Hence, the 
expansion of investment and employment and the rise in wages recover the aggregate tax base 
by approximately three quarter of the initial cost. 
Figure 4.4 Effect of ACE on GDP 
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Figure 4.5 Welfare effects of ACE 
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The welfare effects of an ACE are smaller than the GDP effects. First, part of the additional 
production is due to more employment. This has a cost in terms of less leisure time, which is 
accounted for in the welfare effects. Second, the expansion of investment is due to capital 
imports from abroad. While this increases domestic production, it is accompanied by an 
increase in the net foreign asset position. This raises the difference between GDP and gross 
national income. Overall, welfare expands by 0.8% of GDP. Figure 4.5 shows that the effect 
ranges between a low 0.3% of GDP for Bulgaria and Romania to more than 1% in Germany, 
Italy and Spain. According to Figure 4.5, also the welfare effects of an ACE are positively 
correlated with initial corporate tax rates. 
4.1.2 Adjusting corporate tax rates9 
The previous section assumes that the government budget is balanced by adjusting lump-sum 
transfers to maintain a balanced government budget. This provides insight in the pure efficiency 
costs of corporate tax systems. The exercise is, however, artificial from a policy perspective as 
governments typically have no access to lump-sum taxes or transfers. Government will 
therefore use other distortionary taxes to finance an ACE. This section considers the case where 
 
9
 Under an ACE system, fiscal depreciation rules are irrelevant for investment since accelerated depreciation reduces the 
equity allowance and vice versa (see section 2). We therefore do not consider an ACE combined with a simultaneous 
change in fiscal depreciation rules as the effects of such adjustments are immaterial. 
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the government budget is balanced by adjusting the statutory corporate tax rate. Hence, this 
experiment keeps the total tax burden on corporations unchanged, but modifies its structure. 
The rate is modified to balance the government budget ex-ante, i.e. before behavioural effects 
are taken into account. If government revenues change ex-post due to behavioural effects (such 
as changes in investment or employment), the budget is closed ex-post by an adjustment of 
consumption taxes.10 To obtain feasible solutions in CORTAX, we put a cap on the maximum 
allowable corporate tax rate at 55% for all countries and of 35% for Estonia.11 This rate 
becomes binding for Italy and Estonia. The economic effects of this ACE are presented in Table 
B.2 in Appendix B. This section discusses the main results and compares them with the 
outcomes of the previous subsection, i.e. where lump-sum transfers are used to balance the 
government budget. In the figures, we do not show the effects for Estonia, Malta, Belgium and 
Luxembourg which are outliers for their own specific reasons that we do not want to emphasise. 
Figure 4.6 Increase in corporate tax rates necessary to balance the government budget ex-ante under ACEa 
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a
 Rates are capped at 55% in all simulations (binding for Italy). For Estonia, the maximum is set at 35%. 
Source: CORTAX simulations, 26 European countries excluding Luxembourg 
 
Figure 4.6 presents the 2007 rates of corporate tax (black bars) and the necessary increase in 
these rates to ensure revenue-neutrality after the introduction of the ACE. The necessary 
increase in the corporate tax rate can be sizable: on average, the GDP-weighted corporate tax 
 
10
 The reason for closing the budget ex-post with consumption taxes is that, for a number of countries, the model does not 
converge if corporate tax rates would be used to balance the budget ex-post. The effect on the consumption tax can now be 
interpreted as the ex-post revenue impact of the ACE reform.  
11
 These are lowest caps for these countries, necessary to ensure a feasible solution with CORTAX.  
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rate in Europe rise by 13%-points. The increase ranges between less than 10%-points in low-tax 
countries like Ireland, Bulgaria and Cyprus to more than 15% in Italy, Germany and France. 
Figure 4.7 Investment effects of ACE under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the effects of ACE on investment. To facilitate a comparison between the 
experiment with transfer adjustment and corporate tax rate adjustment, we draw lines between 
the points reflecting the country-effects. In the figures, countries are ranked according to their 
initial corporate tax rate.  
We see that the investment effects of ACE do not differ much between the case of corporate 
tax rate adjustment and lump-sum transfer adjustment. In fact, by removing the tax on the 
normal return on capital, the ACE turns the corporate tax into a non-distortionary tax on 
economic rents. The corporate tax therefore has the same implications as a lump-sum tax. In 
CORTAX, however, corporate taxes still exert subtle income and incentive effects under an 
ACE. For instance, investment financed by debt is still affected by the corporate tax rate due to 
accelerated depreciation and nominal deductibility of interest. Moreover, economic rents earned 
in subsidiaries are ultimately repatriated to their foreign parents, which are subsequently owned 
by their domestic residents. Governments thus export the tax burden abroad when they raise the 
corporate tax rate under an ACE, making this policy more attractive for domestic residents than 
an adjustment of lump-sum transfers.  
Figure 4.8 shows the effects on profit shifting. In CORTAX, a higher corporate tax rate in a 
country reduces the transfer price that parents charge for intermediate deliveries to their 
subsidiaries in other countries. Similarly, foreign parents charge a higher transfer price for 
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intermediate deliveries with subsidiaries in the country that raises its tax rate. The modified 
transfer prices reduce the corporate tax base. The total effect depends on the importance of 
multinationals in the economy. Figure 4.8 suggests that the effect of profit shifting is relatively 
small in Central and Eastern European countries. This is because inward and outward FDI 
stocks in these countries is relatively small. As a result, the increase in the corporate income tax 
rate exerts only small adverse revenue effects via profit shifting. Other countries in Figure 4.8 
show larger adverse revenue effects from profit shifting, up to more than 1% of GDP in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK.   
Figure 4.8 Effects of ACE on profit shifting under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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To arrive at the welfare effects of ACE, we combine the effects induced by profit shifting and 
the effects induced by the higher cost of capital. It illustrates the key trade-off for governments 
considering a unilateral introduction of an ACE. On the one hand, ACE reduces the cost of 
capital, stimulates investment and raises welfare. On the other hand, if ACE is financed by 
higher corporate tax rates, it erodes the tax base due to adverse profit shifting. Figure 4.9 shows 
the balance of these two effects for individual EU countries. We see that the negative welfare 
effect induced by higher rates dominates in four countries: the Netherlands, UK, France and 
Germany. In the other countries, the welfare gain associated with the lower cost of capital 
dominates.  
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Figure 4.9 Welfare effects of ACE under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
4.1.3 Adjusting labour or consumption taxes 
The revenue implications of ACE reforms may alternatively be compensated by adjustments in 
other taxes. One reason might be that an ACE is part of a reform whereby the government 
replaces an income-based tax system by a consumption-based tax system. It is not necessary 
under the consumption-based tax system to levy higher rates on economic rents, especially if 
these rates cause large effects on international tax planning and location. Thus, an alternative 
way to finance the ACE could be an increase in other taxes. Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B 
show the effects of ACE if labour taxes and consumption taxes are adjusted, respectively. Here, 
we summarize the effects. Figure 4.10 shows the effects of ACE on employment if either 
corporate, labour or consumption taxes are used to balance the public budget. Figure 4.11 
shows the effects on welfare.  
Figure 4.10 shows that an ACE raises employment in almost all countries, even if labour 
taxes or consumption taxes are increased to balance the government budget. The positive effect 
on employment is considerably smaller in these cases, however, as compared to the adjustment 
in the corporate tax. The reason is that the incidence of the corporate tax falls on the fixed factor 
under an ACE, while higher consumption and labour taxes fall to a larger degree on labour and 
thus more strongly discourage labour supply.  
The outcomes suggest that the consumption tax is less distortionary for labour supply than 
the labour tax. The reason is that the consumption tax applies to all income, both from labour 
and profits. To the extent that its incidence is borne by the fixed factor, it mitigates the 
 55 
distortionary effect of the consumption tax on labour supply. The labour tax only applies to 
labour income. As a result, the labour tax features a narrower tax base than the consumption 
tax. It thus requires a more substantial increase in the marginal tax burden on labour to balance 
the budget, with larger adverse labour supply effects.  
Figure 4.10 Effect of ACE on employment, alternative tax adjustments 
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Figure 4.11 Welfare effect of ACE, alternative tax adjustments 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
 
The welfare effects presented in Figure 4.11 suggest that some countries find it more attractive 
to finance the cost of ACE with an adjustment in corporate taxes, while others find it more 
attractive to raise consumption taxes. The former group of countries are on the left part of 
Figure 4.11, i.e. they feature low corporate tax rates. As these countries typically have a small 
multinational sector, a higher corporate tax rate is not so distortionary to finance the cost of an 
ACE. Therefore, the distortionary effect of a consumption tax exceeds that of the corporate tax. 
The group of countries on the right of Figure 4.11 feature higher tax rates and host a larger 
multinational sector. For these countries, higher corporate taxes are more distortionary than 
higher consumption taxes because of the adverse revenue effects via profit shifting.  
4.2 European ACE reform 
If countries would jointly implement an ACE, the implications will be different in the presence 
of international spillovers. This holds in particular if statutory corporate tax rates are adjusted, 
since these trigger fiscal spillovers via international profit shifting. Table B.5 in Appendix B 
shows the economic effects of a European introduction of ACE. Thereby, the government 
budget is balanced by an adjustment in corporate tax rates ex-ante.  
Figure 4.12 compares the effect of the unilateral and the multilateral introduction of ACE on 
profit shifting. We see that the adverse effects on corporate tax-to-GDP ratios are smaller if 
countries simultaneously increase their tax rates. Hence, whereas individual countries suffer 
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from profit shifting if they unilaterally increase their corporate income tax rate, this effect is 
mitigated if other European countries do the same. Cooperation on corporate tax rates thus 
reduces the international spillovers through profit shifting and makes an ACE more attractive. 
Figure 4.13 shows that a European-wide introduction of ACE yields a positive welfare 
effect for all EU countries, including the countries that suffer a welfare loss in case of a 
unilateral introduction of ACE. Indeed, the smaller international spillover via profit shifting 
render the ACE more attractive from a welfare perspective for all countries. The welfare gains 
from a reduction in the cost of capital now dominate the welfare loss induced by profit shifting. 
European coordination thus allows governments to design more efficient corporate tax systems 
by allowing more investment incentives and higher tax rates.  
Figure 4.12 Effects of European and unilateral ACE on profit shifting 
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Figure 4.13 Effects of European and unilateral ACE on welfare 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
4.3 Outside tax havens and discrete location 
The simulations so far take account of neither profit shifting by multinationals to tax havens 
outside the EU, nor discrete location decisions in presence of mobile economic rents. This 
section explores the impact of ACE if we include these channels. In the simulations, we assume 
that governments adjust statutory corporate tax rates to balance their budget, as both channels 
are triggered by changes in these rates. After discussing the impact of tax havens and discrete 
location choices separately, we present the combined impact of these two extensions. 
4.3.1 Outside tax havens 
The impact of tax havens in CORAX does not depend on the unilateral or multilateral character 
of the ACE. Therefore, we only show the impact of tax havens in case of a European ACE. The 
effects are presented in Table B.6 of Appendix B.  
Figure 4.14 shows the welfare effects of the ACE in the model with and without the tax 
haven. We see that the inclusion of the tax havens reduces the positive welfare effect of an 
ACE, especially in high-tax countries. On average, a European ACE raises welfare by 
approximately 0.6% of GDP if tax havens play no role, but by only 0.3% if tax havens are taken 
into account. The reason is that corporate tax rates increase by more than 18%-point, which is 
4% more than in the absence of tax havens due to a smaller initial tax base. The higher rates 
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induce multinationals to shift more profits to the tax haven. In the UK and France, profit 
shifting even renders the welfare effect of a European ACE negative.  
Figure 4.14 Welfare effect of a European ACE with and without outside tax havens 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
The inclusion of tax havens exerts a relatively small effect on the welfare implications of ACE 
in Germany and Italy in Figure 4.14. The reason is that the corporate tax rate is capped at a 
maximum of 55%, which becomes binding for these countries. Since other countries need to 
increase their tax rates more substantially, Germany and Italy benefit from this as less profits 
are shifted to other EU countries. This offsets the adverse effects of higher tax rates on profit 
shifting to outside tax havens.  
4.3.2 Discrete location 
Discrete location choices matter for multinationals that choose between investment in different 
European countries. We therefore explore the implications of discrete location choices by 
considering unilateral ACE reforms. Table B.7 in appendix B shows the economic implications. 
Figure 4.15 compares the welfare effects in a model with and without discrete location choices. 
Note that the effects on location is a zero-sum game for the EU as a whole. The loss of capital 
in one country thus comes along with a gain in another country. These spillover effects are not 
visable in Figure 4.15, which only shows individual country effects of unilateral reforms. 
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Figure 4.15 Welfare effect of Unilateral ACE in EU countries, with and without discrete location 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
Figure 4.15 shows that the welfare effects of an ACE are less favourable in the presence of 
endogenous location choices. This is because the higher corporate tax rates increase the tax 
burden on profitable investments, thereby reducing the attractiveness of a location for investors. 
Indeed, the ACE moves the tax burden from the marginal investment towards economic rents. 
This creates location distortions if rents are mobile. An average European country benefits from 
an ACE in terms of welfare by around 0.3% of GDP if discrete location choices are ignored. In 
the presence of mobile rents, this effect is negligible. Especially high-tax countries in Western 
Europe are more likely to experience a reduction in welfare in response to the ACE as 
multinational firms are relatively important in those countries. The low-tax countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe still find the ACE attractive as these economies rely more heavily on purely 
domestic firms. 
4.3.3 Tax havens and discrete location 
To get an idea of the impact of ACE under both tax havens and discrete location choices, we 
consider a unilateral ACE in a model where both channels are incorporated. The effects are 
presented in Table B.8 of Appendix B. The welfare effects are shown in Figure 4.16. We see 
that ACE is considerably less attractive in terms of welfare in the extended model. In particular, 
the welfare gain of an ACE in the basic version of CORTAX by 0.3% on average turns into an 
average welfare loss of 0.15% when tax havens and discrete location choices are included. It 
shows how the two channels modify the attractiveness of an ACE when revenues need to be 
recovered through higher corporate tax rates. Figure 4.16 shows that especially Western 
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European countries suffer from severe welfare losses due to an ACE. A number of Eastern 
European countries where multinational firms play only a modest role in the economy may still 
find it attractive to introduce an ACE. 
Figure 4.16 Welfare effect of Unilateral ACE in EU countries, with and without outside tax havens and 
discrete location 
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
CY
P
BG
R IRL LV
A
HU
N
RO
M
LT
U
PO
L
SV
K
SV
N
CZ
E
AU
T
DN
K
GR
C
NL
D FIN PR
T
SW
E
GB
R
ES
P
FR
A
DE
U ITA
Tax haven & Discrete location Basic model
 
Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
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5 CBIT reform in CORTAX 
This section discusses the outcomes of CBIT reforms in CORTAX. The structure is the same as 
in section 4. Section 5.1 starts with a unilateral CBIT where revenue neutrality is obtained by an 
adjustment of lump-sum transfers or other taxes. Section 5.2 compares unilateral and 
multilateral CBIT reforms. Finally, section 5.3 analyses CBIT in extended versions of 
CORTAX where tax havens and discrete location choices are modelled.  
5.1 Unilateral CBIT reform in EU countries 
We introduce CBIT reforms in the 27 Members of the EU by simulating an abolition of the 
interest deductibility. The interest deducted is simply computed in CORTAX as the product of 
total assets, the debt share taken from ORBIS and the nominal interest rate.12 In principle, a 
CBIT reform along the lines of the US treasury proposal is more complicated than this. First of 
all, we do not consider changes in personal taxes on capital, which are all abolished under the 
US-treasury proposal. Second, it depends on the tax treatment of various forms of income, such 
as interest receipts from CBIT and non-CBIT entities. In particular, a CBIT reform would 
exempt interest received by firms when this income comes from other CBIT entities, such as 
banks. This may reduce the base broadening potential of the CBIT reform as compared to our 
assessment. However, interest received by banks would be taxed when it originates from non-
CBIT entities, including foreign sources. This would further broaden the tax base. The approach 
taken in CORTAX seems a reasonable approximation of the revenue-impact of CBIT. For 
Belgium, we assume that the introduction of CBIT is accompanied by an abolition of the ACE, 
which avoids distortions in the financial structure in favour of equity finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 Debt-asset ratios taken from ORBIS reflect gross figures taken from the liability side of the balance sheet of firms. 
However, firms also hold equity stakes and deposits, i.e. on the asset side. For a proper analysis of CBIT, we need to 
determine the net debt shares. Using Dutch micro data from tax accounts, we compared the ratio using gross debt and 
equity and using net debt and equity. It appears that the ratios are almost the same. 
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5.1.1 Balanced budget with lump-sum transfers 
In the simulations, the government budget is first balanced by adjusting government transfers to 
households. The simulation outcomes are presented in Table B.9 in Appendix B.  
Table 5.1 Summary of results for CBIT reforms with lump-sum adjustmenta 
  
Corporate tax revenue (ex-post) (% GDP) 2.8 
Transfers (ex-post) (% GDP) 0.7 
Debt share (∆) − 7.7 
Cost of capital (∆) 1.1 
Wage (%) − 4.3 
Capital (%) − 12.0 
Employment (%) − 1.7 
GDP (%) − 4.6 
Welfare ((∆ in % GDP) − 1.2 
  a
 Weighted averages for EU countries. 
Source: CORTAX simulations 
 
By broadening the corporate tax base, the CBIT raises corporate tax revenue. Figure 5.1 shows 
by how much the corporate tax-to-GDP ratio increase in EU countries according to CORTAX. 
The black bars show the current corporate tax revenue; the grey bars show the additional 
revenue due to the abolition of interest deductibility. Together, the two bars add up to the post-
reform corporate tax-to-GDP ratio. Corporate tax revenue rises by 2.7% of GDP, which is an 
increase of about 76% of the current revenue. This is larger than the revenue implications of an 
ACE. It is mainly because debt/asset ratios typically exceed 50% in the calibration of 
CORTAX.  
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Figure 5.1 Effects of CBIT on corporate tax-to-gdp ratio in CORTAX 
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Source: CORTAX simulations 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the economic implications of CBIT according to CORTAX for the 
average of the EU. Again, the effects are driven by responses in the financial structure of firms 
and responses in investment. Like the ACE, the CBIT eliminates the tax advantage of debt over 
equity, thereby reducing the debt share by 7.7% on average. The effect differs between 
countries. Figure 5.2 shows that it varies with the initial corporate tax rate. The reduction in the 
debt share ranges from less than 4% in Bulgaria and Cyprus to more than 9% in France and 
Spain. 
Comparing this result with the ACE suggests that the impact of CBIT on corporate financial 
policy is not symmetric. In particular, while the tax distortion on debt-equity choices is fully 
neutralised under CBIT, this is not the case under the ACE. The reason is that ACE applies to 
the capital stock registered in the tax accounts, while the interest deductibility applies to the 
actual interest payments. As a result, accelerated fiscal depreciation increases in value under 
interest deductibility and still favour debt over equity finance. 
Table 5.1 shows that CBIT raises the cost of capital by 1.1%-point on average in the EU. 
This reduces investment by 12%. This contrasts to the impact of ACE. Indeed, disallowing 
interest as a cost for corporate taxation raises the tax burden on interest and, therefore, on debt-
financed investment. Figure 5.3 shows that the negative impact on investment is correlated with 
the corporate tax rate: the higher the rate, the stronger investment falls. This is due to the 
differential impact of CBIT on the cost of capital in different countries. The cost of capital rises 
by 0.2%-point in Bulgaria and Cyprus and by around 1½%-point in Italy and Germany. The 
initial corporate tax systems determine these distortionary effects, which is proxied by the tax 
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rate. In Belgium, we find a reduction in investment of 21%, which is due to the simultaneous 
introduction of CBIT and the abolition of ACE. 
Figure 5.2 Effect of CBIT on debt shares 
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Figure 5.3 Effect of CBIT on investment 
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The reduction in investment due to CBIT reduces labour productivity and, therefore, wages. 
This discourages labour supply and reduces employment. The reduction in capital and labour 
cause a decline in GDP by 4.6% on average in the EU. This effect varies between − 0.9% in 
Cyprus and around − 7% in Germany and Italy. The contraction of economic activity has 
implications for the revenue effects of the CBIT, ex-post. Indeed, while corporate tax revenues 
increase by 2.8% of GDP ex-ante, aggregate tax revenues rise by only 0.6% of GDP ex-post. 
Hence, the erosion of corporate, labour and consumption tax bases cost more than three quarters 
of the initial revenue. 
The welfare effects of CBIT are smaller than the effects on GDP. This is due to an 
improvement in the net foreign asset position against the rest of the world and the extra leisure 
associated with less employment. On average, welfare falls by 1.2% of GDP. The effect ranges 
between − 0.2% in Cyprus and − 1.9% in Italy. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that the negative 
welfare effects of CBIT correlate with the initial corporate tax rate.  
Figure 5.4 Effect of CBIT on GDP 
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Figure 5.5 Welfare effects of CBIT  
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5.1.2 Adjusting corporate tax rates 
This section considers CBIT when the government recycles the revenues via lower corporate 
tax rates. As under ACE, the corporate tax rate is modified ex-ante, i.e. before behavioural 
effects are taken into account. If government revenues change due to such behavioural effects, 
the budget is closed ex-post by consumption taxes. The economic effects of CBIT with 
corporate tax rate adjustments is presented in Table B.10 in Appendix B. In the figures in the 
rest of this section, we usually exclude Estonia, Malta, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Figure 5.6 shows that CBIT allows for a substantial reduction in corporate tax rates. The 
black bars show the new tax rates after the CBIT reform and the grey bars denote the reduction 
in tax rates made possible by CBIT. On average in the EU, the rate is reduced by 12.3%-points. 
The reduction in tax rates range between 3%-points in Cyprus and Bulgaria to 18%-points in 
Italy and almost 16% in Germany. The Belgian rate is reduced by more than 23%-points due to 
the simultaneous abolition of the ACE and introduction of CBIT. Compared to the ACE, the 
change in tax rates seems small. Remind, however, that the tax base is considerably broader 
under CBIT than under ACE: the CBIT tax base contains capital income and economic rents; 
the ACE tax base contains only economic rents. The revenues raised per %-point under ACE 
are therefore smaller than under CBIT. 
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Figure 5.6 Reduction in corporate tax rates made possible by CBITa 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 26 European countries excluding Luxembourg 
  
Figure 5.7 Investment effects of CBIT under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Figure 5.7 shows the effects of CBIT on investment. We again draw lines between the points to 
facilitate the comparison and rank countries according to their initial corporate tax rate. We see 
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that the negative economic effects of the CBIT become considerably smaller if the revenues are 
used to cut corporate tax rates as compared to lump-sum recycling. The reason is that the lower 
tax rate reduces the cost of capital, both on equity-financed investment and debt-financed 
investment. The average increase in the cost of capital falls from 1.1% in case of transfers to 
0.2% in case of lower corporate tax rates. As a result, investment falls by only 2% instead of 
12%; GDP falls by 0.8% instead of 2.8%. These results suggest that CBIT still exacerbates 
investment distortions by shifting the tax burden away from economic rents towards the return 
on (debt-financed) investment, but the impact is mitigated by rate reduction. 
Figure 5.8 shows the effects of lower corporate tax rates on profit shifting, which is the 
opposite of the effects under an ACE. Indeed, a lower corporate tax rate in a country reduces 
the transfer price that home parents charge for intermediate deliveries to their subsidiaries in 
other countries and foreign parents charge a lower transfer price for intermediate deliveries with 
home subsidiaries. The effect on the corporate tax base depends on the importance of 
multinationals. It is small for the Central and Eastern European countries and large for Western 
European countries. Hence, the lower corporate tax exerts relatively large benefits via profit 
shifting to some of the West-European countries, up to more than ½% of GDP in Belgium.  
The effects on profit shifting are smaller than the adverse revenue consequences under the 
ACE reforms, where revenue effects go up to more than 1% of GDP. The reason is that the 
convex cost of transfer price manipulation makes it increasingly costly to shift profits into 
countries if they feature a lower corporate tax rate. The profit shifting channel is therefore not 
symmetric between tax increases and tax reductions. 
Figure 5.8 Effects of CBIT on profit shifting under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Figure 5.9 Welfare effects of CBIT under corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
The welfare effects of CBIT illustrate the same trade-off as the ACE but in an opposite way, 
namely between the welfare costs of a higher cost of capital and the welfare gain due to inward 
profit shifting. Figure 5.9 shows that the balance of these two effects is marginally positive for a 
number of countries, mainly those featuring high corporate tax rates (i.e. on the right in Figure 
5.9). Hence, countries that would suffer most from CBIT under lump-sum recycling are most 
likely to benefit if revenues are recycled through lower corporate tax rates. Other countries 
marginally lose from CBIT in terms of welfare as the impact of a higher cost of capital 
dominates the gains from profit shifting. 
Combining CBIT with more generous depreciation allowances 
In principle, the revenues from base broadening under CBIT could be used alternatively to grant more generous 
depreciation allowances. This would be an effective way to offset the upward effect of the CBIT on the cost of capital. In 
the most extreme version, CBIT could be combined with immediate expensing of investment. Under such a system, 
which comes close to an R-base cash-flow tax, marginal investment is undistorted by the tax system. An R-base cash-
flow tax, however, leaves all interest received untaxed so that financial institutions go untaxed. This differs from CBIT 
where interest received from non-CBIT entities will still be taxed at the level of financial intermediaries.  
While using revenues from CBIT to grant more generous depreciation allowances will mitigate marginal investment 
distortions, it leaves less room for cutting statutory corporate tax rates. In fact, it relaxes the trade-off inherent in the 
design of CBIT between the adverse effect on investment and the positive effect on location and profit shifting. Granting 
more generous depreciation instead of lowering corporate tax rates, reduces both of these effects.  
 
 71 
5.1.3 Adjusting labour or consumption taxes 
The revenue of CBIT may alternatively be used to cut labour or consumption taxes. Tables B.11 
and B.12 in Appendix B show the effects for all countries, which are summarised in this 
section.  
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the effects of CBIT on investment and employment, 
respectively, under alternative ways to recycle the revenue. Figure 5.10 shows that investment 
falls considerably if labour taxes or consumption taxes are reduced, but that this adverse effect 
is reduced if corporate tax rates are cut. The reason is that lower consumption or labour taxes do 
not compensate for the increase in the cost of capital induced by CBIT, as the lower corporate 
tax rate does. These taxes do affect labour supply though. According to Figure 5.11, the 
negative effect of CBIT on employment is mitigated or even turned into an expansion if 
countries use the proceeds to reduce labour taxes. Indeed, compared to corporate taxes, lower 
labour taxes are more effective to stimulate labour supply incentives and to raise employment. 
On average, employment falls by 0.1% if the revenues from CBIT are used to cut labour taxes. 
With lower consumption or corporate taxes, employment falls by 0.9% and 0.3%, respectively.  
Figure 5.10 Effects of CBIT on investment, alternative tax adjustments 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
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Figure 5.11 Effect of CBIT on employment, alternative tax adjustments 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
CBIT reduces GDP more under lower labour or consumption taxes than under lower corporate 
taxes. This is due to the larger adverse investment effects. Figure 5.13 shows that the difference 
in welfare effects is smaller. This is because lower capital import reduces the net foreign asset 
position and exerts only a small effect on national welfare (via the impact of capital on wages). 
For a number of countries, we actually observe an increase in welfare if the proceeds of CBIT 
are used to cut labour taxes, despite the decline in GDP. This applies mainly to countries that 
already feature a low corporate tax rate (i.e. left in Figure 5.13). In other countries, welfare 
drops. Indeed, countries with higher corporate tax rates (i.e. right in Figure 5.13) will find it 
more attractive to reduce corporate tax rates instead of labour or consumption taxes. If the 
revenues from CBIT are used to cut consumption taxes, we find that welfare drops in all 
countries.  
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Figure 5.12 Welfare effect of CBIT, alternative tax adjustments 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
5.2 European CBIT reform 
International spillover effects can be mitigated if European countries simultaneously introduce 
CBIT and reduce statutory corporate tax rates.13 Table B.13 in Appendix B shows the economic 
effects of a European introduction of CBIT and the budget is balanced by an adjustment in 
corporate tax rates. Here, we compare these results with a unilateral policy. 
Figure 5.13 compares the effect of the unilateral and the multilateral introduction of CBIT on 
profit shifting. We see that the expansion in individual corporate tax-to-GDP ratios is smaller if 
countries simultaneously reduce their tax rates. Hence, while individual countries may find it 
attractive to introduce CBIT and reduce corporate tax rates, this policy is less likely to be 
attractive from an EU perspective. Figure 5.13 reveals that some low-tax countries actually lose 
revenue under a multilateral reform. This is because the reduction in corporate tax rates in high-
tax countries mitigates profit shifting towards low-tax countries, even though these countries 
reduce their rates too. Indeed, the convex cost of manipulating transfer prices implies that profit 
shifting into low-tax countries rises only slightly while the reduction in profit shifting from 
high-tax countries drops relatively much.   
 
13
 In principle, the ex-ante revenue effect of CBIT may differ between a unilateral and a multilateral introduction. Indeed, if a 
single countries introduces CBIT, interest received from abroad will be considered as non-CBIT income and, therefore, be 
liable to tax in the CBIT country. In contrast, if all countries adopt CBIT, the interest will come from another CBIT entity and, 
therefore, will be exempt from taxation. The revenue from CBIT for an individual country will then be smaller than under a 
unilateral CBIT. In the simulations, we ignore this difference.  
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Figure 5.13 Effects of European and unilateral CBIT on profit shifting 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
Figure 5.14 shows the welfare effects of a European-wide and a unilateral introduction of CBIT. 
As a unilateral reduction in corporate tax rates is more beneficial for countries than a 
simultaneous reduction in all countries, we find less favourable welfare effects under the latter 
policy. Indeed, welfare declines in most countries due to CBIT under a joint European 
implementation. 
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Figure 5.14 Effects of European and unilateral CBIT on welfare 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
5.3 Outside tax havens and discrete location 
This section explores the impact of CBIT if we include profit shifting to tax havens and discrete 
location decisions in CORTAX. We assume that statutory corporate tax rates are adjusted to 
balance the government budget ex-ante (consumption taxes ensure revenue neutrality ex-post). 
5.3.1 Outside tax havens 
Figure 5.15 shows the welfare effect of a European CBIT with a simultaneous reduction in 
corporate tax rates. It compares the effects with the model that excludes tax havens. A European 
CBIT typically reduces welfare by approximately 0.1% of GDP on average if we ignore outside 
tax havens. The inclusion of tax havens renders the European CBIT welfare enhancing on 
average for the EU (+ 0.2% of GDP). Especially Western European countries benefit as the 
lower corporate tax rates reduce the amount of profits shifted to tax havens. This welfare gain 
occurs because firms engage in less costly profit shifting efforts while they now pay to their 
national governments instead of foreign tax haven governments. The welfare gain runs up to 
between 0.4% and 0.5% for countries that feature the highest tax rates, such as Germany and 
Spain. 
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Figure 5.15 Including tax havens, welfare effect of European CBIT with corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
5.3.2 Discrete location 
Figure 5.17 shows the welfare effects of unilateral CBIT reforms in Europe when corporate tax 
rates are reduced to balance the government budget. A lower corporate tax rate reduces the tax 
burden on mobile rents, which makes a country more attractive as a location for production. 
Accordingly, CBIT becomes more attractive for individual countries via the channel of discrete 
location. Instead of a small average reduction in welfare, discrete location choice turns CBIT 
into a welfare enhancing policy, which raises welfare by around 0.5% on average. Especially 
countries that host a large multinational sector benefit from the lower tax rates via the inflow of 
production units that yield firm-specific economic rents.  
5.3.3 Tax havens and discrete location 
Figure 5.18 shows a unilateral CBIT in EU countries if CORTAX includes both tax havens and 
discrete location choices. The two channels reinforce the positive welfare effects associated 
with lower corporate tax rates. Accordingly, welfare expands by 0.75% of GDP for an average 
country in the EU. In some high-tax countries with large multinational sectors, welfare goes up 
by around 2% of GDP. 
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Figure 5.16 Including discrete location, welfare effect of unilateral CBIT with corporate tax rate adjustment 
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Figure 5.17 Tax havens and discrete location, welfare effects of unilateral CBIT with corporate tax rate 
adjustment 
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6 Combined ACE & CBIT reform in CORTAX 
Both ACE and CBIT reforms move the corporate income tax closer to a system that is neutral 
with respect to capital structure. Yet, while ACE reduces the cost of capital but requires higher 
corporate tax rates, CBIT does precisely the opposite. In principle, a combination of ACE and 
CBIT reforms can be designed which mitigates distortions in capital structure without having 
implications for the cost of capital or corporate tax rates.  
This section considers such a combination of the ACE and CBIT systems. The combined 
reform is designed such that, on average, it is revenue-neutral ex-ante. The percentages of ACE 
and CBIT should add up to 100% in order to achieve full neutrality of the system with respect 
to financial decisions. To design such a revenue-neutral combination, we have experimented 
with an ex-ante version of CORTAX, i.e. a model without behavioural responses but only 
bookkeeping identities. The experiments suggest that a combination of ⅔ of an ACE and ⅓ of a 
CBIT meets the conditions, i.e. revenue neutrality and neutrality with respect to financial 
structure. Hence, the revenue loss from the ⅔ ACE is, on average in the EU, offset by the extra 
revenue obtained from the ⅓ CBIT.  
However, when implementing such a ⅔ ACE with ⅓ CBIT, it may not be revenue-neutral 
for each individual country. Indeed, high-tax countries will probably experience an increase in 
tax revenues because they feature a relatively high leverage ratio to start with. Low-tax 
countries will likely see their tax revenues fall due to relatively low leverage. To obtain 
revenue-neutral reforms for each country, we designed a set of country-specific ACE-CBIT 
combinations. For instance, while the ⅔ ACE - ⅓ CBIT yields a positive revenue in Italy,  a 
73% ACE and 27% CBIT in Italy is precisely revenue neutral. In this way, we determine for all 
countries the revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT. In each case, the combination 
adds up to 100% to ensure neutrality with respect to capital structure. The ACE moves from 
54% in Cyprus and Poland to over 70% in Italy and Germany. The country-specific revenue-
neutral combinations are then simulated with CORTAX.  
For Belgium, we have not explored the ACE-CBIT combination as it already has an ACE 
system in place. Therefore, no revenue-neutral combined reform is feasible in Belgium that 
eliminates tax distortions in capital structure. In the simulations, consumption tax rates are 
adjusted if revenues change ex-post after the ACE-CBIT reform. The results for each country 
are presented in Table B.17 in Appendix B. Here, we summarise the main findings. The 
economic effects of the combined ACE-CBIT reform on average in the EU are summarised in 
Table 6.1.  
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6.1 Country-specific ACE-CBIT reform 
Table 6.1 shows that the combined ACE&CBIT reform reduces the debt share by 6.1% on 
average in the EU. Indeed, both ACE and CBIT work in the same direction by reducing the 
benefit of debt finance. Figure 6.1 shows that the effect on the debt share ranges between 2.8% 
in Bulgaria to more than 7% in Spain, Malta, Czech Republic and France. 
Table 6.1 Summary of results of revenue-neutral ACE & CBIT reform in EU countriesa 
  
Corporate tax revenue (ex-post) (% GDP) 0.0 
Debt share (∆) − 6.1 
Cost of capital (∆) − 0.1 
Wage (%) 0.3 
Capital (%) 0.7 
Employment (%) 0.1 
GDP (%) 0.3 
Welfare ((∆ in % GDP) 0.3 
  a
 GDP-weighted averages for EU countries. Shocks are country-specific to ensure revenue neutrality ex-ante. Consumption taxes are 
adjusted to keep the budget balanced ex-post. 
Source: CORTAX simulations 
 
Figure 6.1 Effects of revenue-neutral ACE & CBIT combinations on debt shares 
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The effects of the combined ACE-CBIT reform on economic variables are small but positive. 
Table 6.1 suggests that investment rises by 0.7% on average while GDP expands by 0.3%. The 
reason for these small effects is that the two reforms have opposing effects on the cost of 
capital: the ACE-part reduces the cost of capital on equity-financed investment; the CBIT-part 
raises the cost of capital on debt-financed investment. Overall, the cost of capital slightly falls 
in the EU. This explains the rise in investment, which is also shown in Figure 6.2.  
GDP expands in light of the extra investment. Moreover, the higher capital stock raises the 
marginal productivity of labour and, therefore, wages. This induces extra labour supply so that 
employment expands. This adds to the rise in GDP as shown in Figure 6.3.  
Figure 6.4 shows that all countries (except for Belgium where we do not impose a reform) 
experience a welfare gain due to the combined ACE-CBIT reform, mostly somewhere between 
0.1 and 0.4% of GDP. It reflects the welfare gain associated with the alleviation of the financial 
distortion. In particular, the social cost of debt finance currently exceeds the private costs due to 
the discrimination of the tax system in favour of debt finance. The ACE-CBIT combination 
removes this discrimination so that firms decide to reduce their debt ratio. Thus, they save on 
financial distress and agency costs, which creates a social benefit.  
Figure 6.2 Effects of revenue-neutral ACE & CBIT combinations on investment  
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 Figure 6.3 Effects of revenue-neutral ACE & CBIT combinations on GDP 
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Figure 6.4 Welfare effects of revenue-neutral ACE & CBIT combinations  
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6.2 European reform, tax havens and discrete location 
The previous section explores the combined ACE-CBIT reform when implemented individually 
by each of the European countries. As in sections 4 and 5, we could alternatively explore the 
combined ACE-CBIT reform when implemented on a European scale. Moreover, we could 
explore the reform in the extended version of CORTAX in which tax havens and discrete 
location choices are modelled. We do not, however, present these results here. The reason is 
that the effects of both the coordinated reform and the reforms in the extended version of 
CORTAX yield the same effects as in section 6.1. The reason is that the combined reform is 
revenue-neutral so that statutory corporate tax rates remain unchanged. International spillovers 
via profit shifting, either or not to tax havens, and discrete location choices are driven in 
CORTAX by changes in these statutory corporate tax rates. As they do not change, the effects 
are not modified either. The effects of the previous section therefore carry over to these other 
cases. 
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7 Sensitivity analysis 
The simulation outcomes depend on the parameterisation in CORTAX. On various parameters, 
there is uncertainty about values, either because of variation in empirical estimates or because 
empirical evidence is scarce. This section demonstrates the robustness of our findings by 
performing a sensitivity analysis on a number of parameter values. We first explore parameters 
that determine, respectively, the strength of investment responses, the ease to adjust financial 
structures and the change in transfer prices in response to tax rate differentials. Then, we 
present a sensitivity analysis with respect to the size of the fixed factor. Finally, we consider a 
sensitivity analysis on the model that includes a tax haven and discrete location. The full 
outcomes of the ACE and CBIT reforms with alternative parameters are presented in Tables 
B.18 – B.27 in Appendix B. Here, we summarize the most important differences.  
7.1 Investment and financial behaviour 
For the first two sensitivity analyses on the production function and debt policy, international 
spillovers are not important. To focus on the variation in the strength of investment and 
financial responses, the reforms are explored where the government budget is balanced by 
changes in the consumption tax rate. The outcomes are reported in Table 7.1. The first column 
shows the outcomes from the baseline simulation. In the second column, we reduce the 
substitution elasticity between labour and capital in production from 0.7 to 0.5. This reduces the 
investment response to the cost of capital. The third column shows the effects when we reduce 
the tax rate elasticity of the debt share from an average of − 0.27 to − 0.16.  
The second column in Table 7.1 shows that an ACE raises investment less if substitution 
between labour and capital is more difficult. Investment rises by 5.6% on average compared to 
7.5% in the baseline simulation. Under CBIT, investment declines by 9.1% compared to 11.3% 
in the benchmark. The smaller effect on investment implies a smaller change in GDP as well. In 
terms of domestic wages, however, the difference is small. This is because a smaller 
substitution elasticity implies that the same change in investment exerts a smaller effect on the 
marginal productivity of labour. The welfare effects of ACE and CBIT reforms are slightly 
reduced in case of a smaller substitution elasticity as lower substitution implies smaller 
distortions. 
The third column in Table 7.1 shows the that ACE and CBIT exert a smaller effect on the 
debt/asset ratio if the tax elasticity of the debt share is reduced. The ACE now reduces it by 
3.2%-point; CBIT by 4.4%-point. The smaller reduction in the debt share renders the positive 
welfare implications of ACE also smaller. The decline in welfare due to CBIT becomes larger. 
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Table 7.1 Sensitivity analysis of ACE and CBIT reforms regarding investment and financial responses 
 Baseline substitution 
K - L = 0.5 
elasticity of  
debt halved 
ACE reform, consumption tax adjustment 
Debt − 5.4 − 5.4 − 3.2 
Wage 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Capital 7.5 5.6 7.8 
Employment 0.5 0.5 0.5 
GDP 2.4 1.9 2.4 
Welfare 0.6 0.6 0.5 
    
CBIT reform, consumption tax adjustment 
Debt − 7.7 − 7.7 − 4.4 
Wage − 4.3 − 4.7 − 4.8 
Capital − 11.3 − 9.1 − 12.6 
Employment − 0.9 − 0.9 − 0.9 
GDP − 3.8 − 3.2 − 4.2 
Welfare − 0.7 − 0.6 − 0.8 
 
7.2 Transfer pricing and fixed factor 
In the third and fourth sensitivity analyses, international spillovers via changes in corporate tax 
rates are more important. Therefore, we consider for these sensitivity analyses the unilateral 
reforms where the government budget is balanced ex-ante by adjustments in the corporate tax 
rate. The third sensitivity involves the convexity of the cost of transfer price manipulation. We 
halve εq from 1 to 0.5, implying that the elasticity of the inward transfer price with respect to the 
corporate tax rate falls on average from 1.25 to 0.25. This comes closer to the elasticity reported 
by Clausing (2003).  
The fourth sensitivity analysis increases the share of income from the fixed factor. In 
particular, we double the share from 2.5% of value added in the basic calibration to 5% in the 
sensitivity analysis. The income shares of capital and labour decline proportionally with their 
shares in the national accounts. The higher share of economic profits in the economy raises the 
corporate tax base in the initial equilibrium. As a result, corporate tax revenue rises from 3.5% 
to 4.5% of GDP. This has important implications for the ACE and CBIT reforms. For instance, 
due to the smaller share of capital in the economy, the revenue cost of the ACE reform falls by 
0.15% of GDP and the revenue raised by CBIT drops by 0.2% of GDP. In terms of the broader 
corporate tax base, this decline is more pronounced: the cost of ACE in terms of total corporate 
tax revenue drops from 44% in the baseline to 34% in the sensitivity analysis; the rise in 
corporate tax revenue from CBIT declines from 76% to 61%. The change in corporate tax rates 
to ensure revenue neutrality for the government ex-ante is also considerably modified in this 
sensitivity analysis: whereas ACE requires a 14.8%-points rate increase in the baseline, this is 
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only 10.3%-points in the sensitivity analysis. In case of CBIT, the tax rate can be reduced by 
12.3%-points in the baseline but by only 10.4%-points in the sensitivity analysis. 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the impact of the two sensitivity analyses for the ACE and CBIT 
reforms on welfare. Under the smaller elasticity of profit shifting, changes in statutory corporate 
tax rates exert smaller effects on profits allocated in a country. Hence, the higher corporate tax 
rates to finance an ACE induces less outward profit shifting and the lower corporate tax rates 
under CBIT induce less inward profit shifting. Accordingly, the welfare effects of ACE become 
larger and those of CBIT smaller. A unilateral introduction of ACE is always beneficial for 
countries if profit shifting is less important, while this was not the case in the baseline. CBIT is 
no longer attractive for a number of countries if profit shifting is less strong, as it was in the 
baseline. 
A larger share of rents implies modifies the welfare implications of ACE primarily via the 
profit shifting channel. In particular, as the necessary increase in tax rates becomes smaller, 
fewer profits are shifted out of a country if it introduces an ACE. As a result, the cost of the 
ACE effectively falls. Intuitively, the ACE is more efficient as a pure rent tax if the size of 
economic rents is larger. Therefore, the welfare gains of introducing an ACE rise as compared 
to the baseline. Figure 7.1 suggests that only the Netherlands will not gain welfare from the 
introduction of an ACE as profit shifting is still too important and thus more than offsets the 
gains from its introduction. 
CBIT shifts the tax burden away from economic rents towards capital income. With a larger 
share of economic rents in the economy, this policy is less beneficial for welfare. One reason is 
that corporate tax rates decline less so that inward profit shifting becomes smaller. A second 
reason is that the larger share of rents makes corporate tax rates less distortionary as a way of 
raising revenue as this part of the tax is in fact non-distortionary. Therefore, shifting away from 
rents to capital, namely the debt-financed share of investment, becomes increasingly 
distortionary.  
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Figure 7.1 Effect of ACE on welfare if either profit shifting is more costly or if economic rents are more 
importanta 
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a Government budget is balanced by an ex-ante adjustment in corporate tax rates, consumption taxes ex-post. 
Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
Figure 7.2 Effect of CBIT on welfare if either profit shifting is more costly or if economic rents are more 
importanta 
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a Government budget is balanced by an ex-ante adjustment in corporate tax rates, consumption taxes ex-post.  
Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
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7.3 Tax haven and discrete location 
The last sensitivity analysis involves the extended model with the outside tax haven and discrete 
location choice. In sections 4 and 5, the semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base via profit 
shifting to the tax haven is set at − ½. This adds to profit shifting via transfer price manipulation 
that is already in place the basic version of CORTAX. In this section, we set the semi-elasticity 
of profit shifting to the tax haven at − ¼.  
The parameters for location choice regarding firm-specific capital of multinationals is set in 
sections 4 and 5 so as to obtain an overall semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to the tax rate of − 
6, which is the average found in empirical studies. In this section, we reduce this semi-elasticity 
to − 4 which implies a halving of the response of mobile rents to taxes. 
The smaller elasticities imply that changes in statutory corporate tax rates exert smaller 
economic and welfare effects. Accordingly, Figure 7.3 shows that the welfare effects of a 
unilateral ACE reform with corporate tax rate adjustment is generally more favourable than in 
section 4. Still, most Western European countries suffer from a welfare loss by introducing an 
ACE. The exceptions are Germany and Italy in Figure 7.3. However, this is because corporate 
tax rates are capped at a maximum of 55%, which becomes binding for these countries. As 
neighbouring countries do have to raise corporate tax rates further in light of the smaller tax 
base in the presence of a tax haven, this renders the impact for Italy and Germany more 
favourable at the expense of other countries. Figure 7.4 shows that unilateral CBIT reforms with 
simultaneous reductions in corporate tax rates become less beneficial for welfare as compared 
to section 5. Yet, the welfare effects remain positive under the smaller response to corporate tax 
rate reductions for the majority of countries. 
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Figure 7.3 Effect of unilateral ACE on welfare in model with tax haven and discrete location but with 
elasticities halveda 
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a Government budget is balanced by an ex-ante adjustment in corporate tax rates, consumption taxes ex-post.  
Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
 
Figure 7.4 Effect of unilateral CBIT on welfare in model with tax haven and discrete location but with 
elasticities halveda 
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a Government budget is balanced by an ex-ante adjustment in corporate tax rates, consumption taxes ex-post.  
Source: CORTAX simulations, 23 European countries excluding Luxembourg, Belgium, Estonia and Malta 
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8 Conclusion 
This study analyzes reforms in Europe in the direction of a comprehensive business income tax 
(CBIT) and an allowance for corporate equity (ACE). We illustrate the key trade-offs in 
designing such reforms between, on the one hand, efficiency effects via distortions in 
investment and financial structures and, on the other hand, the welfare effects of changes in 
other tax rates. An applied general equilibrium model for Europe is used to quantitatively assess 
the economic implications of ACE and CBIT in EU countries.  
ACE is found to improve efficiency by removing the distortion between debt and equity 
finance and by reducing the cost of capital. If the ACE is accompanied by higher taxes on 
labour or consumption or by lower transfers to households, welfare in Europe expands. 
However, if ACE is accompanied by higher corporate tax rates, the corporate tax base erodes 
due to profit shifting and adverse effects on discrete location of profitable investment. Under 
strong responses to higher statutory tax rates, we find that ACE reforms are welfare reducing 
for most Western European countries. Most Eastern European countries still benefit from ACE 
due to a small multinational sector. A simultaneous introduction of an ACE in Europe tends to 
improve welfare since international cooperation eliminates fiscal spillovers within the EU. 
CBIT improves welfare via smaller distortions in the financial structure of companies. Yet, 
disallowing the interest deduction increases the cost of capital, thereby exacerbating investment 
distortions. When the revenue raised by CBIT is used for higher transfers or reductions in 
labour or consumption taxes, welfare in the EU falls. If CBIT is accompanied by lower 
corporate tax rates, welfare typically rises as lower rates cause a broadening of the tax base via 
inward profit shifting and by attracting discrete profitable investments. Under a European 
CBIT, the benefits are reduced since fiscal spillovers within Europe are mitigated. 
A revenue-neutral combination of ACE and CBIT reforms improves efficiency as it reduces 
distortions in debt-equity choices. Welfare is found to expand slightly on account of this more 
efficient financial structure. Combinations of ACE&CBIT may reflect a simultaneous 
movement towards limitations to the deductibility of interest and reductions in the tax burden 
on the normal return to equity. 
Table 8.1 compares some of our simulations to two earlier studies that are close to ours. The 
table presents the average effect for the EU for ACE and CBIT, where consumption taxes are 
adjusted to keep the government budget balanced ex-post (which is the same as the previous 
studies). We add to this simulations of ACE, CBIT and the combined reform, where statutory 
corporate tax rates are adjusted to keep the government budget balanced ex-ante. Thereby, we 
use the version of CORTAX that includes a tax haven and discrete location choices.  
Our numerical results on ACE with consumption tax adjustment are similar to those 
reported by Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007) for Switzerland, although we report a slightly larger 
effect on the debt ratio. The findings suggest that investment and GDP rise by 7.5% and 2.4% 
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respectively. Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2007) find larger effects of ACE in Germany on 
investment and GDP. With respect to CBIT, our results are more similar to Radulescu and 
Stimmelmayr (2007). Investment falls by 11.3% and GDP by 3.8%. We find that a revenue-
neutral combination of ACE and CBIT is welfare improving: it boosts welfare by 0.3% of GDP.  
Table 8.1 Simulation outcomes of ACE and CBIT reforms, consumption or corporate tax adjustment 
    This study 
  Keuschnigg & 
Dietz (2007) 
Radulescu & 
Stimmelmayr (2007) 
Basic model & 
consumption tax  
Tax haven & location; 
corporate tax 
 
Country  Switzerland Germany European average European average 
ACE 
Debt ratio  − 3.8 n.a. − 5.4 − 3.3 
Employment %∆ 0.4 1.7 0.5 0.2 
Capital stock %∆ 7.8 20.5 7.5 3.8 
GDP %∆ 2.6 9.1 2.4 0.8 
Private consumption %∆ 1.4 4.6 1.2  
Welfare (in % GDP) ∆ n.a. 0.08 0.6 − 0.3 
      
CBIT 
Debt ∆   − 7.7 − 6.9 
Employment %∆  − 1.4 − 0.9  0.4 
Capital stock %∆  − 10.2 − 11.3 0.7 
GDP %∆  − 5.3 − 3.8 1.5 
Private consumption %∆  − 4.7 − 1.6  
Welfare (in % GDP) ∆  − 0.7 − 0.7 1.1 
      
Combined ACE – CBIT      
Debt ∆   − 6.1 − 6.1 
Employment %∆   0.1 0.1 
Capital stock %∆   0.7 0.7 
GDP %∆   0.3 0.3 
Welfare (in % GDP) ∆   0.3 0.3 
 
The results reported in the third column of Table 8.1 reflect a well-known economic view on 
ACE and CBIT. However, the outcomes presented in the last column of table 8.1 shed a very 
different light on them. In particular, if corporate tax rates are increased to cover the cost of an 
ACE, welfare falls in the model where tax havens and discrete location choices are included. 
Indeed, higher tax rates cause a substantial erosion of the corporate tax base due to profit 
shifting to outside tax havens and by reducing the inflow of profitable investment projects of 
multinationals. This renders ACE welfare reducing, although GDP still rises slightly. CBIT 
reforms tend to raise welfare in a typical European country since lower corporate tax rates 
attract substantial profits and discrete investments. These results contrast sharply with the 
findings in the third column. Recent empirical studies have emphasised the importance of profit 
shifting and discrete location. The model simulations suggest that this changes the perspective 
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on ACE and CBIT. Interestingly, the combined ACE-CBIT reform designed as a revenue-
neutral policy is independent on whether the model is extended with tax havens or discrete 
location choices as corporate tax rates remain unchanged in this reform. In both cases, the 
reform raises welfare by 0.3% of GDP, which is due to the more neutral treatment of debt and 
equity.  
Figure 8.1 Welfare effect of a unilateral ACE, CBIT and combined reform in the basic version of CORTAX, 
corporate tax rates adjusted to keep revenue neutral 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 24 European countries, excluding Luxembourg, Belgium and Estonia 
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Figure 8.2 Welfare effect of a unilateral ACE, CBIT and combined reform in the extended version of CORTAX 
(including tax havens and discrete location), corporate tax rates adjusted to keep revenue neutral 
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Source: CORTAX simulations, 24 European countries, excluding Luxembourg, Belgium and Estonia 
 
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 summarise for individual countries the welfare effect of the unilateral ACE 
and CBIT reforms with corporate tax rate adjustment and the revenue-neutral combined reform 
of ACE and CBIT. In the basic version of CORTAX, ACE is more attractive than CBIT in the 
low-tax countries of Central and Eastern Europe, who are characterised by a small multinational 
sector. For a number of Western European countries with higher rates and a larger multinational 
sector, however, CBIT is more attractive due to the positive implications of a reduction in the 
statutory tax rate. For many Western countries, the revenue-neutral combination of ACE and 
CBIT outperforms either ACE or CBIT. In the extended version of CORTAX with tax havens 
and discrete location, CBIT is the most attractive reform in the Western European countries 
since lower corporate tax rates exert more favourable effects. ACE is no longer an attractive 
policy in Western Europe.  
The numerical outcomes from CORTAX are consistent with the claims of Bond (2000). He 
argues that ACE may have attractive features for closed economies as it renders the tax system 
neutral for investment. However, base narrowing renders it unattractive for open economies 
since higher corporate tax rates induce a strong erosion of the corporate tax base due to profit 
shifting and fewer profitable investment. Therefore, he advocates CBIT as it allows for 
reductions in corporate tax rates which can induce a broadening of the corporate tax base. Our 
numerical results illustrate precisely this trade-off and show that the effects of changes in tax 
rates indeed tend to dominate for plausible parameters in the model. Indeed, CBIT reforms are 
more likely to yield welfare gains for Western European countries if these countries pursue 
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unilateral policies. If Europe would coordinate their policies, however, fiscal spillovers in the 
EU via profit shifting and discrete locations will be mitigated. This renders ACE-type reforms 
more attractive and CBIT type reforms less attractive from a welfare point of view. Indeed, 
European coordination allows countries to implement a different type of welfare improving 
reforms than is optimal under unilateral policies. 
 
  
 94 
References 
 
Altshuler R., and H. Grubert, 2003, Taxes, repatriation strategies and multinational financial 
policy, Journal of Public Economics 87, 73-107. 
 
Becker, J. and C. Fuest, 2005, Optimal tax policy when firms are internationally mobile, CESifo 
Working Paper no. 1592. 
 
Becker J., and N. Riedel, 2008, Empirical evidence on corporate taxation and 
complementarities within multinational firms, mimeo Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation. 
 
Bettendorf, L and A. van der Horst, 2008, Documentation of CORTAX, mimeo, The Hague. 
 
Bettendorf, L., J. Gorter and A. van der Horst, 2006, Who benefits from tax competition in the 
European Union?, CPB Document no. 125, The Hague. 
 
Bettendorf, L., A. van der Horst and R.A. de Mooij, 2007, Corporate tax policy and  
unemployment in Europe: an applied general equilibrium analysis, ETPF Paper. 
 
Boadway, R. and N. Bruce, 1984, A General Proposition on the Design of a Neutral Business 
Tax, Journal of Public Economics 24, 231–39. 
 
Bond, S.R. 2000, Levelling Up or Levelling Down? Some Reflections on the ACE and CBIT 
Proposals, and the Future of the Corporate Tax Base, in S. Cnossen (ed.), Taxing Capital 
Income in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Bond, S.R. and M.P. Devereux, 1995, On the design of a neutral business tax under uncertainty, 
Journal of Public Economics 58, 57-71. 
 
Bordignon, M., S. Giannini and P. Panteghini, 1999, Corporate taxation in Italy: an analysis of 
the 1998 reform, Finanzarchiv 56, no 3 / 4. 
  
Bordignon, M., S. Giannini and P. Panteghini, 2001, Reforming Business Taxation: Lessons 
from Italy?, International Tax and Public Finance 8, 191–210. 
 
 95 
Buettner, T., M. Overesch, U. Schreiber and G. Wamser, 2008, The impact of thin-
capitalization rules of multinationals’ financing and investment decisions, mimeo University of 
Munich. 
 
Chirinko, R.S., 2002, Corporate taxation, Capital Formation, and the Substitution Elasticity 
Between Labor and Capital, CESifo Working Paper No. 707. 
 
Clausing, K.A., 2003, Tax-motivated transfer pricing and US intrafirm trade prices, Journal of 
Public Economics 87, 2207-2223. 
 
Desai, M.A., C. Fritz Foley, and J.R. Hines, 2003, A multinational perspective on capital 
structure choice and internal capital markets, Harvard NOM Research Paper no. 03-27. 
 
Devereux, M.P. and H. Freeman, 1991, A General Neutral Profits Tax, Fiscal Studies 12, 1–15. 
 
Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith, 1998, Taxes and the Location of Production: Evidence from a 
Panel of U.S. Multinationals, Journal of Public Economics 63, 335–67. 
 
Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith, 2003, Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions, 
International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107–26. 
 
Devereux, M. P., 2006, The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms and Profit: A 
Survey of Empirical Evidence, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 
Series, WP 07/02, Said Business School, Oxford. 
 
Devereux, M.P. and B. Lockwood, 2006, How are plant location decisions and capital flows in 
Europe affected by corporate income taxes?, European Tax Policy Forum. 
 
Devereux, M.P. and S. Loretz, 2007, The Effects of EU Formula Apportionment on Corporate 
Tax Revenues, Fiscal Studies 29.1, 1-33. 
 
Engelen, F.A., H. Vording and S. van Weeghel, 2008, Wijziging van belastingwetten met het 
oog op het tegengaan van uitholling van de belastinggrondslag en het verbeteren van het fiscale 
vestigingsklimaat (in Dutch), Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht 
 
European Commission, 2008, Taxation trends in the European Union: data for the EU Member 
States and Norway, Eurostat Statistical books.  
 
 96 
Evers, M., R.A. de Mooij, and D.J. van Vuuren, 2008, The wage elasticity of labour supply: a 
synthesis of empirical estimates, De Economist 156, pp. 25-43. 
 
Fehr, H. and W. Wiegard, 2003, ACE for Germany? Fighting for a Better Tax System, in M. 
Ahlheim, H.-D. Wenzel and W. Wiegard, eds., Steuerpolitik – Von der Theorie zur Praxis, 
Festschrift fur Manfred Rose, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 
 
Gerard, M., 2006a, A Closer Look at Belgium’s Notional Interest Deduction, Tax Notes 
International, February 6, 449–53. 
 
Gerard, M., 2006b, Belgium Moves to Dual Allowance for Corporate Equity, European 
Taxation 4, 156–62. 
 
Gordon, R.H. and Y. Lee, 2001, Do Taxes Affect Corporate Debt Policy? Evidence from US 
Corporate Tax Return Data, Journal of Public Economics 81, 195–224. 
 
Graham, J., 2003, Taxes and corporate finance: a review, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 
16, no. 4, pp. 1075–1129. 
 
Hassett, K. and R.G. Hubbard, 2002, Tax policy and business investment, in M. Feldstein and 
A. Auerbach (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics Vol. 3, Elsevier North Holland, pp. 1293-
1343. 
 
Horst, A. van der, Bettendorf, L., and Rojas-Romagosa, H. (2007). Will corporate tax 
consolidation improve efficiency in the EU? Document 141, CPB. 
 
Hubbard, R.G., 1997, Capital-market imperfections and investment, NBER Working Paper no. 
5996. 
 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1991, Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax for the 1990s, 
London. 
 
Joint Committee on Taxation, 1997, Tax modelling project and tax symposium papers, 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
 
Keen, M. and J. King, 2002, The Croatian Profit Tax: An ACE in Practice, Fiscal Studies 23, 
401–18. 
 
 97 
Keuschnigg, C., and M.D. Dietz, 2007, A growth oriented dual income tax, International Tax 
and Public Finance 14, 191-221. 
 
Klemm, A., 2007, Allowances for Corporate Equity in Practice, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 
229-262.    
 
Mooij, R. de, 2005, Will corporate income taxation survive? De Economist, 153, 277-301. 
 
Mooij, R. de, and S. Ederveen, 2008, Corporate tax elasticities: a reader’s guide to empirical 
findings, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, forthcoming. 
 
Oropallo, F. and V. Parisi, 2005, Will Italy’s tax reform reduce the corporate tax burden? A 
microsimulation analysis, SIEP Working Paper no. 403. 
 
Overesch, M., 2008, The effects of multinational's profit shifting activities on real investments, 
National Tax Journal, forthcoming. 
 
Radulescu, D.M. and M. Stimmerlmayr, 2007, ACE versus CBIT: Which is better for 
investment and welfare?, CESifo Economic Studies 53, 294-328. 
 
Sørensen, P. B., 2001, OECDTAX: a model of tax policy in the OECD economy. EPRU, 
University of Copenhagen. 
 
Sørensen, P. B., 2004a, Company tax reform in the European Union, International Tax and 
Public Finance, 11, 91-115. 
 
Sørensen, P. B., 2004b, International tax coordination: regionalism versus globalism, Journal of 
Public Economics 88, 1187-1214. 
 
Sørensen, P. B., 2007, Can capital incomes taxes survive? And should they?, CESifo Economic 
Studies 53, 172-228. 
 
Staderini, A., 2001, Tax reforms to influence corporate financial policy: the case of the Italian 
business tax reform of 1997–98, Banca d’Italia Working Paper No. 423. 
 
US Department of Treasury, 1992, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: 
Taxing Business Income Once, US Government Printing Office, Washington. 
 
 98 
Weichenrieder, A., and T. Klautke, 2008, Taxes and the efficiency costs of capital distortions, 
mimeo, CESifo Working Paper no. 2431. 
 
Weichenrieder A. and H. Winidischbauer, 2008, Thin-Capitalization Rules and Company 
Responses -- Experience from German Legislation, mimeo University of Frankfurt. 
 99 
Appendix A  Modelling ACE & CBIT in CORTAX 
To understand the properties of the ACE and CBIT in CORTAX, this appendix discusses in 
more detail how firm behaviour is modelled. CORTAX starts from a standard dynamic 
optimization problem of the firm, which maximizes its value subject to accumulation 
constraints and a production function. In optimizing its value, firms choose their optimal levels 
of employment and investment, as well as the optimal financial structure between debt and 
equity. ACE and CBIT exert a direct impact on financial and investment behaviour. We also 
discuss two extensions of the basic framework: the introduction of a tax haven and the 
modelling of location choices.  
Model of the firm 
Denote the value of the firm in period t by Vt and its dividend payments by Divt. We ignore new 
equity issues and abstract from residence taxes on capital levied at the household level. An 
investor is indifferent between investing in the firm and investing elsewhere at a rate of return r 
as long as: 
tttt VVDivrV −+= +1  (A.1) 
The right-hand side of (A.1) reflects the sum of dividends and capital gains on the investment in 
the firm. The left-hand side shows the return on the asset Vt if it were invested elsewhere. The 
rate r denotes the discount rate used by the firm. Solving (A.1) for Vt yields an expression for 
the value of the firm as the discounted stream of future dividends:  
1
1
1
+−
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ts
ts
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r
DivV  (A.2) 
Dividends follow from the cash-flow restriction of the firm: 
tbttbttttbtbbttt KdKdIKdcrwLYDiv −+−Π−+−−= ++ 11][ τ  (A.3) 
where Yt denotes output (price is normalized to 1) and wLt stands for labour costs. The third 
term on the right-hand side of (A.3) captures the cost of debt. It equals the debt ratio (db) times 
the capital stock (Kt) times the real interest on firm debt rb. In addition to this, the variable cb 
denotes a financial distress or agency cost associated with high debt finance. It depends on the 
leverage of the firm, i.e. cb = cb (dbt). The fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of (A.3) 
reflect corporate tax payments (τΠt ) and investment (It). Finally, cash-flow is affected by a 
change in debt of the firm, captured by the last two terms on the right-hand side of (A.3). 
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The corporate tax base, Πt , is defined as: 
[ ] ttftbtACEtbbtCBITttt IDRDdKRdwLY φδββ −−−+−−−=Π )1()1(  (A.4) 
It consist of total revenue from sales minus labour costs, deductible financial costs and 
deductible depreciation allowances. The third term on the right-hand side of (A.4) reflects the 
deductible financial costs from investment. The parameters CBITβ  and ACEβ  determine 
whether financial costs are deductible. If interest payments are deductible, we have CBITβ = 0. 
This reflects current practice in European countries. As shown by (A.4), it is the nominal 
interest payments on actual debt (dbtRbKt) which are deductible from the corporate tax base, 
where Rb = (1+rb)(1+pi)-1 ≈ r + pi is the nominal interest rate and pi is the rate of inflation. If 
interest is not deductible, as under the CBIT, we have CBITβ = 1.  
Most corporate tax systems do not allow a deduction of the cost of equity, i.e. we 
have ACEβ = 0. Under an allowance for corporate equity (ACE), an imputed return on equity 
capital in the tax accounts is deductible, so we have ACEβ = 1. Following Bond and Devereux 
(1995), we apply a nominal risk-free rate of return R = (1+r)(1+pi)-1 ≈ r + pi which can be set 
equal to the nominal return on bonds (R = Rb).14  
The last two terms on the right-hand side of (A.4) reflect fiscal depreciation. The fourth term 
is the annual rate of fiscal depreciation, equal to δf , times the stock of fiscal depreciable assets, 
denoted by Dt. The last term denotes the share of the investment that can be depreciated 
immediately after its purchase, measured by φ . Note thatφ = 1 would imply immediate 
expensing of investment. If φ = δf, annual fiscal depreciation at rate δf would start in the period 
of purchase, rather than one year after the purchase.  
Regarding economic and fiscal depreciation, we assume a declining balance at a rates of, 
respectively, δ and δf . The accumulation of capital in, respectively, the firms financial accounts 
and its tax accounts is thus reflected by: 
ttt KIK )1(1 δ−+=+  (A.5) 
 
tftt DID )1()1()1( 1 δφpi −+−=+ +  (A.6) 
where (A.6) takes into account that fiscal depreciation only applies to the share that is not 
immediately expensed, i.e. (1-φ ) and that the price of fiscal assets is not indexed for inflation.  
Firm behaviour is now derived from maximizing its value (A.2), subject to the accumulation 
equations (A.5) and (A.6): 
 
14
 Under an allowance for corporate capital (ACC), the deductibility of interest is abolished as it is under the CBIT. At the 
same time, an imputed return on the capital stock according to the fiscal account is introduced, irrespective of its source of 
finance. 
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where λt is the Langrange multiplier for Dt and µt the Langrange multiplier for Kt (Tobins q) and 
discounting occurs at the real rate r. We will now subsequently discuss the optimal choice 
regarding the financial structure and investment by the firm. 
Financial behaviour 
We first optimize (A.7) with respect to the debt share. This yields the following first-order 
condition: 
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The left-hand side of (A.8) denotes the marginal cost of a higher debt share. High debt may be 
costly due to financial distress associated with a larger risk of bankruptcy or higher agency 
costs. In the optimum, the marginal cost of higher debt equal the marginal benefit reflected by 
the right-hand side of (A.8). This marginal benefit of debt finance is equal to the difference in 
the real required market cost of debt versus equity plus a tax term reflected by the terms 
between square brackets. Here, we consider three regimes: 
 
• Under current regimes, we have CBITβ = 0 and ACEβ = 0. In this case, the tax term is positive. 
Hence, due to the discrimination of the corporate tax system in favour of debt, the corporate tax 
rate raises the relative benefits of debt finance. 
• Under CBIT, we have CBITβ = 1 and ACEβ = 0. We see that the tax term now disappears. 
Corporate taxation is thus neutral to the debt/equity choice.  
• Under an ACE regime, we have CBITβ = 0 and ACEβ = 1. Assuming R = Rb, we see that the 
corporate tax is not entirely neutral under an ACE as long as Kt ≠ Dt. The reason is that the ACE 
applies to the equity value in the tax accounts, i.e. to Dt. In contrast, the interest deductibility 
applies to the actual interest payments on debt, applying to Kt. If tax depreciation is more 
generous than economic depreciation, Dt will be smaller than Kt so that debt finance is still 
favoured by the tax system as compared to equity finance.  
 
The benefits from debt finance on the right-hand side of (A.8) are independent of the debt share. 
To avoid a corner solution in which firms find it optimal to finance the entire capital stock with 
either debt or equity, we specify a convex cost function of holding debt. In particular, we use 
the following function for the cost of holding debt: 
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As long as the debt share exceeds εb, expression (A.10) suggests that the marginal cost of 
holding debt is positive. The marginal costs tend to rise in the debt share and fall in the 
parameters χ and εb. Hence, the higher the initial leverage of the firm, the more costly it is to 
further raise the share of debt finance. The parameters χ and εb are set at levels so as to replicate 
the elasticity of the debt share found in empirical studies.  
Investment behaviour 
To find optimal investment, we specify the production function Yt = CES (Kt , Lt ) as a constant 
elasticity of substitution function with capital and labour as inputs. Production features 
decreasing returns to scale with respect to these to inputs. Thus, a fixed factor is at the 
background, which earns an economic rent in production. In optimizing its value, the firm 
determines the optimal demand for labour and investment. Labour demand is determined by 
setting the value of the marginal product of labour equal to the before-tax wage rate. Below, we 
concentrate on the demand for investment. Denote the marginal product of capital as YK . The 
first-order conditions for investment It, and the stock variables Dt and Kt  read as follows: 
µλφφτ +−=− )1()1(  (A.11) 
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)1()()()1( CBITbbbbbK RdcrrdrY βτδµτ −−−−−+=−  (A.13) 
where we used the property that λ and µ are constant on a steady state balanced growth path. 
The first-order conditions in (A.11) – (A.13) together determine the optimal investment by 
firms. In particular, by substituting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.13), we get the following 
expression for the optimal capital stock:15 
 
15
 We assume no adjustment costs in capital formation so the capital stock will immediately move to its new optimum 
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Expression (A.14) denotes the cost of capital, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital that is 
required to make up for the cost of finance and depreciation. In the absence of a corporate 
income tax, the cost of capital is equal to the financial cost of investment (i.e. the weighted 
average of debt and equity) and economic depreciation. To understand the impact of corporate 
taxation, we first consider the case of equity-financed investment (i.e. if the marginal debt share 
is zero, db = 0). In that case, (A.14) and (A.15) modify to: 
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We see that the cost of capital is equal to that in the absence of tax (r + δ), plus a tax term 
between square brackets. The tax term is zero under two parameterisations: φ = 1 or ACEβ = 1. 
Ifφ = 1, there is immediate expensing of investment, which transforms the corporate income 
tax into an R-based cash-flow tax. This system is neutral to the cost of capital and, therefore, for 
investment. If ACEβ = 1, the normal return on equity-financed investment is deductible from 
the corporate tax. Whatever the rate of fiscal depreciation, the corporate tax is now always 
neutral to the cost of capital and investment. This neutrality property of the ACE requires that 
the imputed return on equity equals the nominal discount rate used by the firm, i.e. the rate R.  
In the absence of an ACE ( ACEβ = 0) and φ < 1, the term between square brackets on the 
right-hand side of (A.16) is always positive. Hence, corporate taxes raise the cost of capital 
financed by equity. A higher cost of capital requires that the marginal product of capital 
increases. In light of decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital in production, a smaller 
capital stock is required to achieve this. Consequently, a higher cost of capital induced by a 
higher corporate tax rate will reduce investment.  
Expression (A.16) can also be used to assess the impact of a marginal change in the 
direction of an ACE: 
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Expression (A.17) shows that the ACE reduces the cost of capital at the margin, which will 
encourage investment. Expressions (A.18) and (A.19) suggest that the ACE exerts a larger 
reduction in the cost of capital if a country starts with a high corporate tax rate and a broad tax 
base, respectively. Intuitively, a high corporate tax rate and a broad tax base render the tax 
system more distortionary at the margin so that an ACE is relatively effective in reducing these 
distortions. 
If part of investment is financed by debt (db > 0), (A.15) is modified as the financial cost of 
investment is now a weighted average of the cost of debt and the cost of equity. We see that the 
cost of debt is reduced by the deductibility of nominal interest costs as long as CBITβ = 0. The 
interest deductibility thus reduces the cost of capital, perhaps even below the level obtained in 
the absence of tax. The introduction of CBIT will abolish the interest deductibility and thus 
raises the cost of capital. Indeed, differentiating (A.15) yields: 
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Hence, reforms in the direction of CBIT will raise the cost of capital and reduce investment. 
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced if the corporate tax rate is higher. Movements towards 
a CBIT will therefore be more distortionary in countries featuring high corporate tax rates.  
Profit shifting behaviour 
In producing output, subsidiaries use intermediate inputs that are supplied by their parent 
company. The arms-length price for this intermediate input is equal to the market price of the 
numeraire good, but the parent company can manipulate this transfer price for intra-company 
deliveries. In particular, the benefit from marginally changing the transfer price is measured by 
the difference in the statutory corporate tax rate that applies to the subsidiary (τf) and the rate 
that applies to the parent (τm). This benefit needs to be weighed against the cost of transfer 
pricing. We adopt the following cost function for manipulating transfer pricing (i.e. the price 
that the headquarter charges for goods supplied to its subsidiary): 
q
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Hence, deviating the transfer price (pq) from its arms-length price (equal to one) creates a cost 
for the multinational, which is convex if εq > 0. In the optimum, the marginal cost from transfer 
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price manipulation is set equal to marginal benefit, which is determined by the corporate tax 
differential between the foreign subsidiary and the multinational headquarter, i.e.: 
mf
qq
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1)1(  (A.22) 
Expression (A.22) shows that the headquarter company has an incentive to set an artificially 
low (high) transfer price for supplies to subsidiaries in countries that feature a lower (higher) 
statutory corporate tax rate. In this way, it shifts profits from high to low-tax countries, thereby 
reducing its overall tax payment. The marginal cost of this manipulation depends on the initial 
deviation of the transfer price from its arms-length price. The speed at which transfer prices 
increase is determined by the parameter εq. In the model, we set its value so as to replicate 
empirical evidence on profit shifting.  
Modelling an outside tax haven 
In an extended version of CORTAX, we introduce an outside tax haven that features an 
exceptionally low corporate tax rate, denoted by τh. Firms are able shift part of their profits to 
this tax haven, independent of the amount of FDI they have invested. Hence, the inclusion of a 
tax haven reflects other modes of profit shifting than transfer price manipulation. In modelling 
profit shifting to tax havens, we assume that firms decide about the effort they put into profit 
shifting activities. This effort is denoted by θ. The idea may be that the multinational has to 
invest manpower in the relations with the subsidiaries and governments in the tax havens. The 
higher the effort, the more profits will be shifted to the tax haven but also the higher will be the 
costs involved. In particular, for each euro paid in corporate tax, the tax saving from profit 
shifting is assumed to rise linearly in the effort, i.e.  
 )( hττθ −=Θ  (A.23) 
The costs of profit shifting per euro of profit is assumed to rise in a convex way in the effort, 
i.e.  
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where γ ≥ 0. The costs and benefits enter the expression for dividends 
Π−ΘΠ+= psorg cDivDiv τ  (A.25) 
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where Divorg denotes the original dividend equation in CORTAX. By optimising the value of 
the firm with respect to the effort θ, we find the following first-order condition 
γτττθ )]([ hA −=  (A.26) 
Substituting into the dividend equation yields that the average net benefit from profit shifting is 
positive as long as τ  > τh  
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ps Ac  (A.27) 
which is due to the convex character of the cost function. For the government, profit shifting to 
the tax haven implies a revenue loss equal to 
Π−=ΘΠ +γττττ 1)]([ hA  (A.28) 
In the calibration of CORTAX, we set γ equal to 1 so that the costs of profit shifting rise 
quadratically in effort. The parameter A is set in such a way that we obtain a reasonable amount 
of profit shifting.  
Discrete location choice 
Another extension of CORTAX refers to location choice. The literature on foreign direct 
investment emphasises that investment is not only responsive to the cost of capital, but that also 
inframarginal investment and location choices are important. One reason may be that firms earn 
firm-specific economic rents that are mobile across borders. Such rents can be due to patents, 
brand names, specific managerial talents or market power. Firms then locate their affiliates in 
countries where the average effective tax rates are relatively low.  
In CORTAX, we do not explicitly model the origins of firm-specific economic rents. 
Instead, we endogenise the value of economic rents earned by a multinational in CORTAX in 
each location by making it dependent of the corporate tax rate. In particular, suppose that the 
multinational owns a firm-specific fixed factor H, which it can allocate between two countries, 
Hi and Hj. If the firm maximizes the sum of profits in the two locations (Πi + Πj), the first order 
condition with respect to the allocation of the fixed factor in country i reads as 
0)1()1( =−−−=
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ττ  (A.29) 
In the production function of CORTAX, firms combine labour and capital using a CES 
production function and then combine this with the fixed factor using a cobb-douglas structure. 
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This yields a simple expression for the marginal value of allocating the fixed factor in each of 
the two locations. Using this production structure, we can write the optimal share of the fixed 
factor in the two locations as: 
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where X denotes the composite input of labour and capital. Hence, the share of the fixed factor 
allocated in country j relative to country i falls in the tax rate in country j relative to country i. 
In CORTAX, we model the share of the fixed factor of a multinational in a specific country as a 
function of the statutory tax rate in that country, relative to the weighted EU average. The 
responsiveness of the fixed factor to this tax differential is set so as the replicate empirical 
estimates on the impact of corporate taxes on FDI.  
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Appendix B  Tables of CORTAX results on ACE & CBIT 
The tables in this appendix show the country-specific outcomes of several simulations of ACE 
and CBIT. In presenting the results, we focus on the following variables 
 
• CIT-rate  = absolute change in the statutory corporate tax rate 
• Rev_CIT = absolute change in the corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP 
• Rev_tax  = absolute change in total tax revenue as a share of GDP 
• Debt   = absolute change in the debt / asset ratio, average across all firms 
• Shift_CIT = relative change in the corporate tax base induced by profit shifting 
• CoC  = absolute change in the cost of capital, average across all firms 
• Wage  = relative change in the wage rate 
• Capital  = relative change in total capital stock 
• Employm. = relative change in total employment 
• GDP  = relative change in gross domestic product 
• Welfare  = absolute change in − 1 x compensating variation expressed in % of GDP 
    (i.e. positive value reflects a welfare gain) 
 
Tables B.1 – B.8 show the effects of ACE reforms. In Table B.1, the government budget is 
balanced through adjusting lump-sum transfers. Tables B.2 – B.4 explore the same ACE reform 
under alternative assumptions regarding closure of the government budget. In Table B.2, we 
adjust the corporate tax rate to balance the budget ex-ante, i.e. before behavioural responses are 
taken into account. If behavioural responses have implications for tax revenue, the budget is 
balanced ex-post by adjusting consumption taxes. Tables B.3 and B.4 consider revenue 
neutrality by means of adjustment in labour income taxes or consumption taxes, respectively. 
These taxes are adjusted so that the government budget is balanced ex-post, i.e. after taking into 
account behavioural responses on tax revenue. Table B.5 shows ACE reforms if European 
countries coordinate their policy. It is primarily important when international spillovers are 
large, which is the case if corporate tax rates are modified. We therefore show European ACE 
reforms only if the corporate tax rate is adjusted to balance the government budget ex-ante 
(consumption taxes ensure ex-post revenue neutrality). Table B.6 shows the same European 
ACE if we include a tax haven in the model. Tables B.7 and B.8 show the unilateral ACE with 
corporate tax rate adjustment in the model that includes discrete location, respectively discrete 
location and tax havens. 
Tables B.9 – B.16 show the effects of CBIT reforms, with the same assumptions as under 
the ACE. Hence, Table B.9 assumes lump-sum revenue recycling of the revenues from CBIT, 
Table B.10 considers an ex-ante adjustment of corporate tax rates, and Tables B.11 and B.12 
look at an ex-post adjustment of labour and consumption taxes. Tables B.13 and B.14 consider 
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a common European CBIT with revenue recycling via lower corporate tax rates, either or not 
with a tax haven. Tables B.15 and B.16 consider CBIT in the model with discrete location and 
tax havens. 
Table B.17 presents a combined ACE-CBIT reform, whereby an allowance for corporate 
equity is applied to ⅔ of the nominal risk-free return and the interest deductibility is restricted 
to ⅔ of the current level. This combined reform is approximately revenue-neutral for the 
government ex-ante when viewed from an average EU point of view. If there are revenue 
changes for an individual country, consumption taxes are adjusted to keep the government 
budget balanced. As the combined reform yields very similar effects if other taxes are adjusted 
or if the policy is implemented on a European scale, we only consider one option with respect to 
the balanced budget rule. 
Tables B.18 − B.27 explores ACE and CBIT reforms under alternative parameter values in 
CORTAX. It sheds light on the robustness of the numerical findings for crucial choices in the 
calibration and illustrates the working of the model. The first reduces the substitution elasticity 
between labour and capital in production from 0.7 to 0.5. The second reduces in the cost 
function of debt finance χ0 from 0.015 to 0.03, which reduces the tax rate elasticity of the debt 
share from an average of − 0.27 to − 0.16. The third reduces in the cost of transfer price 
manipulation εq from 1 to 0.5, implying that the elasticity of the transfer price with respect to the 
corporate tax rate falls on average from − 1.27 to − 0.28. A fourth sensitivity analysis raises the 
share of economic rents in the economy from 2.5% to 5%. The final sensitivity analysis halves 
the elasticities of profit shifting to tax havens and discrete location in the extended CORTAX 
model. The first two sensitivity analysis on the production function and debt policy are explored 
for reforms where the government budget is balanced by changes in the consumption tax rate. 
The last three sensitivity analyses are applied to a unilateral reform where the government 
budget is balanced ex-ante by changes in the corporate tax rate.  
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